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Abstract.
“The effect of transit improvements on school choice; the case of public high schools
in Mexico City”
Jorge Ubaldo Colin Pescina
The dissertation investigates the effect of the new bus rapid transit lines on school choice at the high
school level in Mexico City. Since 1996 all public high schools in the Mexico City metropolitan area have
an open enrollment policy based on the result of a common test and the stated preferences of students
on what school they wish to attend. I raise four questions: 1) Are students applying to public high schools
that are in line with their academic potential? 2) Is the time required to commute to school a determinant
factor in the students’ choice of high school?  3) Can improving access to public transit modify the set
of schools to which students apply in their senior high school application process? And 4) What effects
do the transit improvements have on students’ allocated school? The time difference in the introduction
of four new bus rapid transit lines is used as source of variation to mass transit availability. A difference
in difference technique is used to compare these groups across time. I find that about one of every five
students in Mexico City in the last 12 years was allocated to a school below her academic capability
potentially damaging her future performance (under-matching). This is most prevalent among students
from low income areas where academic attainment is low. Transit improvements led students living in
areas that previously had little access to transit to apply to schools that were farther from home. The
greater benefits are for students in the middle and lower part of the academic distribution. Transit
improvements decrease the level of under-matching for these students. Students in wealthier areas see
the quality of their school peers decrease after transit lines start operations. The same happens for high
achievement students from low to middle income areas. I carefully document with maps how transit
modified the location of schools to which the students applied and also to which school they were
allocated. The findings highlight an equity dimension of transit availability as a mean to access quality
education and a fundamental element to exercise school choice.
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1.1 Background and Motivation
It could be argued that the discipline of Economics of Education came into being with two events
that took place midway towards the 1960's. On the one hand Gary Becker (Becker, 1964) built
the theoretical framework for its analysis in his 1964 book “Human Capital; a theoretical and
empirical analysis, with special reference to education”. The second event was the release of the
Coleman Report in 1966 (Coleman, 1966), that brought education research to the center of a
heated policy debate. From its birth research in economics of education has been concerned with
the issue of equity. Enough evidence of this is to remember the title of the Coleman Report:
“Equality of educational opportunity”. Since then abundant research has been performed on the
issue of equity, ranging from financial equity1 and access to the differences of teacher quality2
among different segments of the population.
Another pillar of the discipline of economic of education has been the issue of choice. In 1962
Milton Friedman (Friedman, 1962) introduced the idea of school choice and the proposal to
differentiate between education's public funding and its public provision. Since then school choice
has been advocated by several important economists as a strategy to improve the quality of
education through demand-side pressure and competition (Friedman (1962), Becker (1995),
Hoxby (2002)) similar to the market dynamics for other goods and services. This has led to the
1 See for example Yinger (2004) or Alexander and Wall (2006)
2 See for example Bowen, Chingos and McPherson (2009) regarding higher education or Scott
and Woolsey (2010) regarding access to quality teachers.
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introduction of policies that grant different levels of school choice in a wide array of developed
and developing countries (Musset, 2012). The sign and magnitude of the effect of different school
choice policies on achievement has been the subject of abundant research (Hoxby (2002), Cullen
et al (2006), Rothstein (2006)) but despite this the issue remains controversial, with little evidence
on the effect of choice on student achievement3. An issue that has received much less attention
is the interaction between school choice policies and the characteristics of the urban setting in
which these policies take place. This dissertation studies physical access as an element of the
schooling experience through the role of public transportation in school choice in an urban setting.
As I will argue in this dissertation, transit availability is relevant in efficiency and equity in the
provision of education in the context analyzed.
Studying the relation between the urban setting and school choice is particularly pertinent as the
lives of people become ever more urban. Furthermore, as cities become larger there can be
important differences in the characteristics of the schools accessible to students living in the
different areas of a given city. The population living in cities around the world has been multiplied
more than five-fold between 1950 and 2014, to reach an estimated of 3.9 billion people, about
54% of the world population. Urbanization has also led to an increasing number of “mega-cities”
with 10 million inhabitants or more. In 1990 there were 10 megacities, while in 2014 there were a
total of 28, representing around 12% of the total urban population in the world, Mexico City being
one of the original ten megacities4. Studying school choice in a large metropolitan areas like
Mexico City can shed light on similar dynamics taking place in other megacities around the world.
3 See Altonji et al (2002) and Musset, 2012 for a review of the literature. In Altonji et al (2002) the authors also
suggest that the instruments used in prior studies might not be valid.
4 All population data from the 2014 UN World Urbanization Prospects report, available at:
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html
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The patterns of urbanization have also modified the way the school system is organized. Over
the last 50 years Mexico, the United States, and a number of other countries, have been shifting
from small neighborhood schools to larger schools serving greater catchment areas (Schlossberg
et al., 2006). In consequence students have seen changes in the distance traveled between home
and school which in turn affect the mode of travel for the school commute (Sirard and Slater,
2008). Longer distances traveled have been associated with a higher use of motorized modes,
either public transit or private car, as students substitute away of walking and cycling (Sirard and
Slater, 2008). This process of substitution was one of the earlier motivations to study the role of
transit, which is of chief relevance for students who have no access to a private vehicle.
This dissertation analyzes the interaction of a school choice policy and one urban improvement.
The school policy is the city-wide application process to senior high school. The urban
improvement is the construction of four new bus rapid transit lines.  The interaction is considered
of interest to assess whether the cost of physically accessing the school, and the mobility within
a city (ease of moving from one place of the city to another) is a barrier to the success of school
choice policies. This is analyzed in the context of student applications to public high schools in
Mexico City. The objective is to observe whether changes in the cost of travel (with a strong
emphasis on the time component) alter the characteristics of the schools selected by, and
allocated to, the students. I use the introduction of four different new bus rapid transit lines as a
source of variation in the time cost of travel for individuals living in different parts of the city.
Knowledge of the role of transportation in school choice decisions is fundamental to understand
whether school choice is an effective measure to deal with under-performing schools and under
what circumstances. This issue has a strong equity dimension given that it is often the case that
4
the schools closer to disadvantaged students are underperforming5. The dissertation also
explores if the cost of transportation is an obstacle in the matching process between schools and
students, in particular whether transportation restrictions lead middle-low and low income
students to apply to a limited set of high schools, accessible within reasonable time from their
residences.
The paragraphs above have already relied on concepts and context information not yet laid down
in, such as the concept of match and the high school allocation process in Mexico City. These
topics will be dealt with in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. However, it is important to provide some
general definitions and context before presenting the research questions in Section 1.3.
Mexico City has had a city-level open enrollment policy in place since 1996. Students seeking to
attend a public high school in the metropolitan area submit a list of their 20 preferred schools
when registering for the placement test. After the placement test students offered a seat in one of
their preferred options based on their result on the placement test relative to other students
seeking the same school. Students with higher scores in the placement test having priority to their
preferred schools. Students receive only one offer after this process. It is important to highlight
that in this process schools do not actively select students. They set the number of seats available
before the placement test takes place. Once the results from the placement exam are available
the metropolitan council (abbreviated COMIPEMS by its acronym in Spanish) assigns offers (one
per person) based on performance and students’ preferences. In the thesis I will generally refer
to the group of “selected” or “preferred” schools as those that were listed by the student in the
registration form, and refer to the school “assigned” or “allocated” as the school in which the
student ultimately received an offer. This process of application and school allocation is what I
5 Examples of this is Chicago, IL (Rodrick et al., 2008) and New Orleans, LA (Zimmerman, 2013).
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refer as “matching process”, a  brief definition of matching will be developed in the next section
(1.2).
1.2 Definition of matching.
In order to provide context to the research questions I briefly present here the definition of
matching that is being used in this dissertation. A review of the different perspectives and findings
in the literature is presented in the next chapter (Chapter 2). It is important to highlight that while
“matching” here is being used to denote the high school allocation process the realm of “matching
theory” goes well beyond the admission process of high schools or colleges. Matching theory was
first introduced by the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962) in which a generalized matching
problem, applied to both the marriage market and college admissions, was presented and
analyzed. Matching theory addresses questions in which scare resources need to be allocated to
individuals with heterogeneous preferences without relying on prices or monetary transfers to
balance supply and demand. It has been applied, among other things, into solving allocation of
organs to patients that require a transplant, students applying to schools, and the allocation of
housing to new immigrants. A brief review of matching theory and some of its applications can be
found in Artemov et al (2012). For the purpose of this study I will focus exclusively on the matching
process between the students and the school.
The process of matching between high schools and students is relevant for the education system
in Mexico City because it allows the allocation of a limited number of seats at a system-level
based on students’ preferences and a measure of merit (the placement test). However the
process may carry a series of inefficiencies and contribute to the perpetuation of existing
inequalities at the middle school level. Students are allocated to high schools that vary in quality,
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location, academic tracks, administrative subsystems and peers. Since all students apply at the
same time it is virtually impossible to know a priori which students will be allocated to which
school. However, strong persistence in the relative level of selectivity (as shown in Chapter 4)
implies that students are likely to face meaningfully different peers depending on their selected
options and the ultimate institution to which they are matched. Moreover, the characteristics of
the student in relation to her peers in school can have important consequences, positive and
negative, for the performance and overall educational experience of the student. The different
findings on the literature on this issue are also presented in the next chapter.
When analyzing the matching process in this thesis I will focus on the characteristics of the student
and her peers in the preferred and allocated set of schools, and how this changes across time in
different areas of the city. For this purpose I take the definitions from earlier research on the
Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”) and its open enrollment policy (Cullen et al. 2005, Cullen et al.
2006 and Roderick et al. 2008). Based on these studies I define “Correct-match” to describe
whether a student enrolled in a school with a selectivity level that matches the maximum level of
selectivity that the student would likely have been accepted to, given his or her previous
qualifications. “Under-matching” would be when a student enrolls in a school below his or her
school qualifications. These definitions are used as guides in the process of assessing the
different options available to a student based on her academic potential and relevant school
characteristics for the students’ ultimate requested options. The details on how match and under-
match are calculated using the data will be explained in Section 4.1.
1.3 Research Questions
The dissertation addresses school choice in Mexico City, the matching between schools and
students and the relation of these two phenomena with the availability of public transportation.
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This dissertation specifically attempts to answer four questions.
1) Application behavior of students and the observed match.
Are students applying to public high schools that are in line with their academic potential?
2) Commute and the preferred set of high schools
Is the time required to commute to school a determinant factor in the students’ choice of
high school?
3) The effect of transit on the set of preferred schools
Can improving access to public transit modify the set of schools to which students apply
in their senior high school application process?
4) The effect of transit on the school allocated and its characteristics.
What effects do the transit improvements have on students’ allocated school?
1.4 Structure of the Study
As presented above, an increasing number of people is living in ever larger cities. This has also
brought changes in the way schools operate. Moreover, an increasing number of cities and
countries have introduced school choice policies (Musset, 2012) leading to profound
transformations in education. This thesis investigates the high school application and matching
process of students in a large urban areas adding a geographical dimension to the analysis. It
documents through maps different characteristics of students, their background, their preferred
options and their allocated schools.  Furthermore, the thesis draws causal relation between a very
specific element of urban life, public transit, and different features of school choice, with the
intention of highlighting the importance of accessibility for schooling. As a first step Chapter 2
describes the theoretical model and the pertinent literature on choice, matching and the influence
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of public transportation on school choice, discussing the gaps on the existing literature where this
thesis intends to contribute.
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical background of this
study and a summary on the germane literature on choice, matching and the influence of public
transportation on school choice. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the application process to
public middle schools in Mexico City and contextual information on the process by which the four
new bus rapid transit lines were developed. Chapter 4 and 5 are dedicated to the empirical
analyses. Chapter 4 analyzes the characteristics of the match in the high school system in Mexico
City. Chapter 5 studies the effect of public transportation on school choice and the resulting match.
Chapter 6 concludes with the summary of the findings, interpretation, usefulness and limitations
of the results.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
This chapter presents the theoretical background on school selection. A brief summary of the
literature explaining school choice, and its rational, is introduced as a general framework for the
analysis. The next section summarizes the literature of matching for students transitioning from
one level of studies to the next when school choice is available. This is followed by a review on
the literature of transportation on school choice. After a critical overview of the literature I will
present the gaps I find in the existing work and how this thesis contributes to partially addressing
them.
2.1 School Choice
To set the initial framework of analysis it is important to briefly review what school choice is, what
forms of choice exist, their objective and to what extent have these policies succeeded as a
solution to the different issues they were designed to face. Choice programs can be characterized
by the introduction of market mechanisms in education, such as consumer choice and competition
between schools. “school choice essentially positions parents as consumers empowered to
select from several options – thereby injecting a degree of consumer-driven, market-style
competition into the system as schools seek to attract those families” (Feinberg and Lubienski,
2008).
It is important to acknowledge that, different from most other suppliers, under various context
schools can potentially discriminate who benefits from their services, by allowing or denying
admission. The implications of different admission policies, and behaviors, on the side of the
school will not be reviewed in this thesis. As mentioned before in the Mexico City case public high
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schools do not actively select students, school allocation is done in a centralized process that
relies only on students’ preferences and performance in a placement test.
The arguments to justify school choice can be grouped into three different premises:  the reduction
of inefficiencies, the individual-liberty right for choice in education and school choice as a way to
make education more equitable. School choice schemes can be divided in two main groups:
Universal and targeted programs (Musset, 2012). Universal programs are based mainly on claims
of efficiency and individual-liberty right for choice, while equity tends to have a stronger role in the
arguments for targeted policies. An example of the latter is Becker (1995), one of the early
supporters of focalized vouchers to help disadvantaged families improve their pool of educational
options.
Universal programs allow school choice for all, either within the public sector or in both the public
and private sector. Universal programs that focus on the public sector are: Open enrollment
policies, the introduction of diversity in the provision by public schools6 and universal voucher
programs within the public sector. Universal voucher programs that can be used in private and
public schools represent the main universal school choice program that encompasses both public
and private schools. A public / private voucher program is usually accompanied by the creation of
voucher or charter schools. Schools that are publicly funded, based on the number of students
they serve, and are privately operated. The most frequent targeted school choice programs are
targeted voucher programs. A hybrid of universal and targeted choice programs are universal
progressive vouchers. Under such a scheme the funding attached to each voucher varies based
on the characteristics of the student, where the school usually receives a higher payment for
students coming from disadvantaged backgrounds.
6 An example of this is the creation of schools specialized in the arts, music, or science, that are tailored to specific
curricula and students.
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When assessing the merit of school choice it is also important to review the degree in which the
different programs implemented have succeeded as a solution to the challenges they were
intended to address. As mentioned in the introduction an important part of the policy and research
debates have focused on analyzing the impact of choice on performance. For open enrollment
among public schools some of the best designed research comes from the analysis of lotteries
that take place when schools are oversubscribed. This is the case of Cullen et al. (2006), Cullen
and Jacob (2007) and Hastings et al. (2006). All these paper find no significant benefit in
achievement in attending another public school, comparing lottery winners who attend their
desired school and the loser who stayed in their assigned institution. However, some papers find
positive results for specific subgroups. Hastings et al. (2006) find significant achievement gains
for students with preference for academic quality (based on their estimated utility). Ozek (2009)
finds no significant effect on performance using distance to an alternative school as instrumental
variable; but finds positive results for students originally assigned to under performing schools,
and to schools with high percentage of disadvantaged students (measured as those entitled to
receive free lunch).
Two countries with important voucher programs are Chile and the Netherlands. In both cases the
vouchers program include public and privately-operated schools. On the one hand in their
analysis of longitudinal data in Chile Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) found vouchers have no positive
effect on student achievement, and led to higher sorting as the best students from the public
sector left to voucher schools operated by the private schools. On the other hand, Dijkgraaf et al.
(2008) found that attending a private school has a positive effect on student achievement in the
Netherlands, even after controlling for students  socioeconomic background, and correcting for
selection effects.
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Zimmer et al. (2011) used a longitudinal, within-student analysis to measure the effect of attending
a charter school in value added. They do these for six areas (either cities or states) in the United
States, analyzing the changes using student-level fixed effects. They find no effects in four out of
six analyzed cases. In the two other cases (Texas and Chicago) students in charter schools
performed significantly worse than public school students. Rouse and Barrow (2008) analyze the
literature on the effects of charter schools and vouchers. They find that the best research available
on universal voucher programs finds small achievement gains, which are not statistically different
from zero.
Other studies focus on the analysis of targeted voucher programs. In his analysis of the
Milwaukee vouchers program Patrinos (2000) presents that attendance for three or more years
enhanced academic performance. Peterson et al (2005, 2011) compare students who won the
voucher lotteries to students who lost the lottery in New York, Washington D.C., and Dayton. They
find that students who enroll in a private school thanks to the voucher program perform better
than the voucher losers in a national examination on math and reading. The authors also find
higher parental satisfaction and fewer discipline-related incidents for voucher winners. However,
the mechanisms behind these results have been called into question. While the authors attribute
it to an improvement in school and peer quality, critics worry that they could be the consequence
of short lived shock-effects (Musset 2012).
Other papers explore not only achievement gains, but the effect of choice on other relevant
outcomes. Cullen et al. (2006) find that students who win the lottery experience an improvement
in the overall quality of their peers, with no effect on their own performance. Whether peer quality
could impact other non-performance outcomes is also open to debate. Kling et al (2005) analyzes
the effect of Moving to Opportunity, a voucher program to change residence and school. The
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authors find no effect on academic outcomes. However, they find a lower likelihood of being
arrested for violent and property crimes for males, certainly a relevant effect. Another important
dimension for economists is the issue of costs. School choice is intended to increase efficiency,
and improve resource allocation. However, Levin and Driver (1997) find that once considering the
costs of supervision, transportation and record keeping a voucher system could be more
expensive that the geographical allocation system in place in the US.
A subset of the described school choice policies have also been implemented in Mexico at
different levels. In primary and middle school residential location and proximity to the school is
the main criteria for school assignment in public primary and lower secondary education (Musset,
2012). This method has been a prevalent solution to ensure all students have physical access to
a school within a reasonable commute, and it is present in 27 out of 33 countries in the OECD
(Mexico included). In primary and middle-school students can freely apply to enroll in other public
schools with seats available. By law primary schools cannot discriminate by academic
achievement, income, gender or any other dimension to allocate the available seats, and they are
usually allocated on a first come first served basis. For middle school selection on academic
achievement can be exercised by the school to allocate available seats. There are no voucher or
charter schools in Mexico at any level (Musset, 2012). Public high schools in Mexico City have
set a city-wide open enrollment policy (described in Chapter 3), with a common application
process for the nine public subsystems. Before the introduction of the common application
process students were also free to select their preferred high school. However, they had to apply
to each individual subsystem. The subsystems differed in application process and requirements,
and they did not communicate between each other. It was often the case that some students
would receive several offers, while others received none. The centralized application process
eliminated the first part of the problem, with students receiving only one offer, which also releases
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seats for other students who would have received no high school offer otherwise (Moctezuma
Hernandez 2003).
As previewed in the introduction the effects of school choice on performance have been the
subject of abundant research and the issue has remained highly contested. It remains unclear if
school choice has benefited students’ performance, the cost implications and the effect on other
relevant variables. Rouse and Barrow (2008) phrase it well as they conclude their review “Its
theoretical appeal (of school choice) has led to several, mostly small-scale, attempts to determine
whether students might benefit from such a reform. Unfortunately, results from these small
programs cannot test Friedman’s hypotheses.” It most also be noted that some of the most
promising results are on research of targeted programs that seek to benefit students with a
relatively disadvantaged background. As I will argue in Section 2.4 transit improvement could be
seen as a targeted policy to improve the set of schools available to students in the benefited areas
of the city. The next section presents a brief theoretical model on the school selection process by
students
2.2 Theoretical Model of School Selection.
The model presented in this section intends to illustrate the relation between student
characteristics, school characteristics and the students; preferred set of schools. The objective is
to present a basic framework in which the preferred set of school changes due to the introduction
of new transit lines. A secondary goal is show that under identical preferences students could
have different preferred schools due to issue related to public transportation. The model takes a
standard random utility framework similar to Hastings et al (2006). Let ijU denote the expected
utility of student “i” from attending school “j”. As mentioned before the allocation of high schools
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in Mexico City does not lend itself to strategical listing of schools. Therefore it can be said that
student i selects school j as his or her first option if it maximizes his or her utility over all possible
schools in the choice set. For the first school in the list of preferences the student selects from
the complete list of public high schools in the city ( 1iJ ) so that:
a ij




The subsequent choices (denoted a ij
h ;h∈{2,. .. , 20} ) are made in a similar way, with the
difference that the relevant choice-set in each choice (denoted  202,...,h;J hi  ) exclude schools
already selected by student i. I assume utility is given by
= ( , , )
A function of a series of student characteristics (“P”), school characteristics (“S”), and the effort
required for travel between the residence of student i and school j denoted as ijT . I assume that
(∙) < 0 ∀
I assume that T is itself a function of the route distance between the home and the school “D” and
of the ease of movement between these two locations “M”, which agglutinates the available
infrastructure, urban environment and the financial cost to access available transportation options.
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 ijijij M,Dg=T
With D having a proportional relation to T, and M having an inverse relation to T. For example, two
locations might be relatively far (large D) but connected with an express train (high M) leading to
a “T”-equal to two sites that are closer (lower D), but connected by a local train (lower M). It follows
that for any given student if there are two schools a and b, with equal vector of characteristics
( = ) at an equal distance from the students’ residence ( = ) then
≻ if>
While this framing is simple it is not devoid of implications. A number of models of school
preferences include the distance “D” as a parameter in school selection, omitting the range of
associated levels of mobility between different locations (As in Hastings et al. 2005). This could
lead the analysis to a bias due to the omission of the relation between mobility and the effort
required to access the school. Furthermore, research analyzing choice has used distance to
alternative schools as an instrumental variable in the analysis of school choice. Examples of this
are (Cullen et al (2005), Ozek (2009) and Carneiro et al. (2013)). Choice can be thought to be
related to access not solely to distance.
In the thesis I cannot observe M directly, since I lack detailed travel destination surveys for the
students before and after the introduction of the new transit lines. However, what I can do is to
assess the change in the set of preferred schools before and after the introduction of the transit
improvement, which I assume will modify M. An interesting component of the analysis will be to
assess if the location of the preferred set of schools changes in line with the area served by the
transit lines.
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2.3 The Matching Process.
This section presents the literature regarding the matching process during periods of transition
between education levels that require the selection of preferred schools, and an application
process. I will focus the review on articled exploring the disparities between the student and his
peers, the potential mechanisms behind this differences and the potential consequences for
student performance. This is highly relevant when analyzing the context of public high schools in
Mexico City. Students seeking a position in a public high school can face meaningfully different
peers depending on the school they attend, that in turn is determined by his preferences and
performance. What leads students to select a school, and the effect of his peers has been subject
to abundant research, a brief review of which is presented here.
A number of studies have stablished important levels of inequality in access to the Mexican
education system (Lachler, 1998). However, in Mexico City every year there are thousands of
academically capable, low-income students who do graduate from middle school and are well
prepared for high school. These are students who could enroll in a high school that matches their
potential, but few do. Instead, many of these students attend high schools with peers well below
their own performance, where graduation rates are low. Others do not enroll in high school at all.
This phenomenon, first studied in the high school to college transition, has been called “under-
matching”. This term specifically refers the level of selectivity of the matched school being “under”
the most selective school the student could have attended. However, it might also be perceived
to presents a value judgment, implying that this leads to negative consequences for the student.
As with school choice the effect of peers in school performance and other outputs is mixed.
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Particularly, Alwin and Otto (1977) find small but negative context, or mismatch, effects. In which
students are negatively affected by being matched to institutions, or peers, that are too demanding
for the student. The existence of mismatch effect is also examined by Rothstein et al. (2008) in
their analysis of the effects of Affirmative Action in law schools. They find that black law students
are less likely to graduate, pass the bar exam or practice law. About half of this variation comes
from differences in the initial credentials, and that maximum half of the differences could come
from potential mismatch effects.  The authors also find no evidence mismatch effect for the top
quarter of black students (based on their result in LSAT). In contrast with Alwin and Otto (1977)
Bowen, Chingos and McPherson (2009) conclude that high school students are most likely to
succeed and graduate college when they attend the most academically demanding institution that
will admit them. They find that “81% of academically qualified students who attended a selective
university graduated within 6 year, compared with 66% of academically qualified students who
attended a less selective 4-year institution.”
Manski and Wise (1983), one of the first to analyze the transition to college in the United States,
found sharp differences in the rate in which students attended higher education that could not be
explained by previous performance. Their analysis revealed that differences in income and
parental education played an important role in the process of self-selection into applying and
attending higher education, either at a two-year or four-year college. Avery (1999) speculated that
potential differences in terms of access to student advising on application to college and financial
aid could be a major cause in the differences observed. For this purpose the author set out an
advisement program in schools in the Boston area and documented the differences between the
students who participated and those who did not. Large effects were found in terms of the rate of
students applying for college and on the likelihood of applying to a four-year college. These
studies were some of the first asking why students were not applying to colleges in line with their
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potential. The study program found that information could be a very important factor. However,
because participation in the study was voluntary the results could not have been interpreted as
causal, due to the self-selection issue. These first studies analyzed important differences in
application rates and behavior, particularly across income lines, but they did not generate an
explicit definition of correct match or under-match.
The first studies to introduce the concept of “matching” as used in this thesis analyzed data from
the Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”) and its open enrollment policy (Cullen et al. 2005, Cullen et
al. 2006 and Roderick et al. 2008). Based on these studies I define “Correct-match” to describe
whether a student enrolled in a school with a selectivity level that matched the kind of school the
student would likely have been accepted to, given his or her previous qualifications. “Under-
matching” would be when a student enrolls in a school below his or her school qualifications7. The
details on how match and under-match are calculated will be explained in Chapter 4.
Cullen et al. 2005 analyze if the difference in graduation rates between students who opt out of
assigned schools and those who remain can be attributed to the open enrollment policy in place
in the city. In their analysis the authors use distance to a schooling alternatives as an instrument
for the degree of school choice. Based on this instrumental-variable estimation they find no effect
of open enrollment policies on graduation or performance. Attributing the large differences in
graduation rates mainly to differences in motivation and other non-observable variables. Roderick
et al. (2008) describe whether a student enrolled in a college with a selectivity level that matched
the kind of colleges the student would likely have been accepted to, given his or her high school
qualifications. They found that among highly qualified students in Chicago who would have been
7 It is important that this definition is seriously limited in regard to other characteristics of a school. Future work could
assess if matching to larger schools, or schools with different structures affect the performance of the student,
independently of the relative school selectivity. Chapter 6 will include the analysis of school-size variables in an
effort to assess whether transportation has an effect on this set of indicators.
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eligible to attend a highly selective college, close to half enrolled either in non-selective
institutions, two year colleges or did not enroll at all. The authors hypothesize that lack of
information or financial constraints could be potential causes for this behavior. Given the level of
aggregation of the data they were unable to test their hypotheses, but their framework has helped
to guide future causal analysis.
Hoxby and Turner (2013) implemented a randomization approach to test the hypotheses raised
by Roderick et al. (2008). Students with high academic performance from low income high schools
were offered semi- customized information about the academic options in line with their
achievement. Students were also granted application-fees waivers for a number of schools and
received information on what they should expect the net cost of college to be8. The authors found
that treated students submitted 47% more applications, applied 47% more to “peer” public
universities, were admitted to 31% more colleges, were 77% more likely to have been admitted
to a “peer” college and were 46% more likely to have enrolled at a “peer” institution. Being all the
results above mentioned statistically significant.
Abundant evidence of under-matching at the high school level has also been found in developing
countries at the middle and high school level. In many cases under-matching in developing
countries has been associated with errors in the process of application, such as selecting schools
that have no seats available, or listing schools with higher average entrance requirements as an
option below a less selective school, a strategic mistake under many matching mechanisms.
Examples exist in the case of Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012), Ghana (Ajayi, 2011) and China (Lai
et al. 2009). In all these cases mistakes were more likely to be made by students with lower
previous qualifications, with less educated parents and from lower socioeconomic status. To the
8 Given that expected college price can be meaningfully different from “ticket prices” for low income students after
financial aid packages are decided by the university. . Hoxby and Turner (2013)
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best of my knowledge no study specifically looking at under-matching exists for Mexico or Mexico
City.
Under-matching can only be considered a relevant phenomenon if it affects the students who are
under-matched. As mentioned before Bowen, Chingos and McPherson (2009) find that under-
matched students are about 15% less likely to graduate college within six years. An important
mechanism for the effects of under-matching are the changes in peer characteristics that it can
cause. A thorough review on the literature on peer effects can be found in Sacerdote (2011). He
concludes that for elementary, secondary and post-secondary levels “Linear-in-means models
find modest sized and statistically significant peer effects in test scores. (…) Using nonlinear
models, one prevalent finding is larger peer effects in which high ability students benefit from the
presence of other high ability students”.  Looking at the effects beyond test scores; Gaviria and
Raphael (2001) analyze high school data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey and
find strong peer effects in drug use, alcohol drinking, smoking and the likelihood of dropping out
of high school.
Bobba and Frisancho (2014) is one of the first papers analyzing the misallocation of students in
Mexico City and the role of information. They study whether inaccurate perceptions about ability
generate misallocations through inadequate school choices. They do so by providing students
with a mock version of the high school placement test and assign a random portion of them to
receive feedback on their performance prior to the submission of school preference rankings.
They find that the intervention helps some students aligning expectations about their own ability
with actual achievement. In particular those who receive positive feedback (result in the mock test
above their expectations) tend to choose a significantly higher share of schools that belong to the
academic-oriented track. This leads choices towards a “positive assortative matching equilibrium
in which better performers tend to choose (and be allocated to) more academic-oriented school-
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tracks”. Bobba and Frisancho (2014) do not analyze the relation of the placement test score with
the student and the average score of her peers in the allocated school, or the levels of under-
matching in the general population before or after their intervention.
2.4 The Role of Transportation on School Choice
The different school choice policies and decision frameworks and their implications for a range of
academic and non-academic outcomes have been the subject of study of the economic literature.
This literature has been briefly reviewed in Section 2.1. This section intends to summarize the
literature linking school choice and transportation, looking at the potential effects on performance
and equity outcomes. This sections includes a review of the relationship between segregation on
academic and non-academic dimensions and school choice and how distance to school has been
included in the economics of education research. This section also presents a review on the effect
of transit improvements in other settings of economic research, particularly labor economics, as
guidance of the effects I would expect to find in this thesis.
The study of the role transportation on schooling has been an area of little analysis until recently
due to data and computational restrictions. Probably one of the earliest examples linking these
two topics is Gertler and Glewwe (1990) who factor in the cost of travel in its calculation of
attending public schools in rural Peru9 in their analysis of attendance and completion. More
recently the introduction of geography in the analysis of economic phenomena has significantly
increased. An example of this is Moretti (2012), who analyzes the important disparities in the
economic trajectory of different cities and its implications for economic growth. In education a
9 See also Muralidharan and Prakash (2013), on the positive effect of providing free bicycles in rural India on
enrollment and graduation rates. In this case the effects where higher for women than for men.
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series of papers have used the distance between the home of the student and the school, a proxy
for the easiness of access, as an instrumental variable in the analysis of the effect of school choice
policies (Cullen et al (2005), Ozek (2009) and Carneiro et al. (2013) are examples of this). An
important area of research for this project is how transit availability, and ease of access, interacts
with school choice, and in particular with open enrollment at the high school level. In the recent
literature distance to school has been added as another attribute of the school, together with peer
quality, class size, etc… Or alternatively it has been included as a component in the cost of
attending a school.
Including distance to school in a school selection analysis acknowledges that travel consumes
financial resources and time, as well causing other inconveniences10. However, limiting the
analysis to distance fails to acknowledge that infrastructure availability can render the cost of
covering the same distance very different. For those familiar with the subway system in New York
City it would be easy to exemplify this issue by comparing going 5 kilometers north - south from
125th and Broadway and traveling the same distance west – east. The time required for the latter
using transit, according to google maps, is almost twice that for the former, even under the best
circumstances.   It is for this reason that this chapter analyzes the effect of transit improvement,
which leads not to a change of distance between any particular home and the school, but which
improves the ease of access between the two.
2.4.1 School Choice and Distance to School
There exists research on the relation between school choice policies and the distance traveled
10 For example, longer distance traveled to school has been associated with higher green-house emissions, longer
commutes and higher exposure to bus fumes (Wilson et al., 2007)
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between the home and the school (Andersson et al (2012), Gomez et al. (2012) and Hastings et
al (2006)). School choice can lead to longer distance traveled. In the District of Columbia (D.C.)
the distance traveled by students who attend out-of-boundary schools is three times the distance
traveled by students attending their allocated schools (Aghzadian, 2009). And distance to a school
can also affect school choice policies. Distance to school has been shown to be relevant in
explaining different attitudes towards school choice. Brasington and Hite (2014) find, for
Cleveland and Chicago, that people living closer to private schools are significantly more likely to
support school choice policies.
The address of a student can be a highly predictive variable of performance when school
assignment is based on geography and students have little access to other schools, either by
policy design or due to lack of other means. In the United States it has been found that ZIP is the
best predictor of student performance, Catsambis and Beveridge (2001) highlight this specifically
for match at 8th grade. Weber and Butler (2007) find that the type of neighborhood in which a pupil
lives is a more reliable predictor of a pupil’s GCSE11 performance than any other information held
about that pupil, after controlling for past performance. The authors also analyze the relation
between the performance of pupils from different types of neighborhood and the neighborhoods
from which the other pupils in the school they attend are drawn. They find that students tend to
perform better in the GCSE test when they attend schools with peers coming from higher-income
neighborhoods. However, it is important to note that their analysis is limited to descriptive
statistics, and the relations found cannot be considered causal. An issue raised by their analysis
is that, in the context of school choice traveling a higher distance (and facing a higher
transportation cost) can be an important mechanism of self-selection. Butler et al. (2007)
11 The General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) is an academic qualification awarded in a specified
subject, generally taken in a number of subjects by students aged 14-16 in secondary education in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland.
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investigate whether the distance between school and the pupil’s home is related to social
background in a six borough area of East London. They find that the six schools in the area which
achieved the highest average points score at GCSE recruit pupils from within the whole East
London (and to a lesser extent outside of the area), while the lowest performing six schools recruit
students from much more narrowly defined catchment areas.
Evidence from other countries in Latin America also support the hypothesis that with higher levels
of school choice we should observe longer trips between the home and the school. Gomez et al.
(2012) analyze the impact of information on the decision of parents to enroll their children in the
closest school to their home, and how this changes for schools of different quality in Santiago,
Chile. One of the pillars of school choice, the authors argue, is how the parents and students
react to new information. In this case they analyze the effect of making the results of a national-
level standardized test (SIMCE) publicly available. The test was established in 1988 but
information on the per-school results was only made available starting in 1997. The authors
estimate the likelihood of enrolling in the school closest to the student in 1996 and in 2003. With
the intention of comparing the most similar students possible they match individuals by block of
residence; if possible they also match on gender, age and schooling of the mother within the same
block. They find that the older the child the lower the probability of choosing the nearest school
and that there is a discrete decrease in the probability of choosing the nearest school when the
student attends high school (at the age of 15). They also find that the probability of attending the
closest school to home decreases with the income of the household and the education of the
mother.
In the analysis of Gomez et al (2012) the average distance traveled increased between 1996 and
2003. Increasing the number of schools near the household decreases the probability of attending
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the nearest school, and decreases the average distance traveled. Households were more likely
to choose the nearest school when its quality was higher or when it was meaningfully closer to
the home. Thus, as economic theory predicts, the paper shows that parents are willing to undergo
a trade-off between quality and distance. The authors find that parents with higher levels of
schooling have a higher valuation of quality relative to distance. They conclude that even when
the results of the standardized tests were not public, parents act "as if” they knew them, which is
reflected by (other things being equal) preferring schools of better quality. When the results of the
tests were made public, this factor became a more important determinant of school choice. It is
important to mention that the authors measure quality as the average scores in the school. The
paper does not consider value added or other potential measures of quality for their analysis.
Two alternative perspectives on the meaning of the difference in distance traveled by students
with different characteristics can be found in Hastings et al (2006) and Andersson et al (2012).
For Hastings et al (2006) distance is an important attribute of a school, in which parents manifest
their differences in preferences. Hastings et al (2006) analyze parents' preferences based on the
submitted request in an open enrollment context. Based on their estimates they identified two
types of consumers. 1) Those who highly value proximity and are unlikely to choose another
school without significant improvements in average school score; 2) Those who place lower value
on proximity and place a high value on school scores. After estimating the preferences the authors
generated simulations on the chances of a school being selected among one of the choices given
an increase of one-third of a standard deviation in its average school performance. They find
different levels of demand-side pressure for schools to improve performance, with low
performance schools facing less pressure. High performance schools saw larger changes in the
likelihood of being selected, given changes in average test scores, compared to low performing
schools.  In other words, the estimated demand for low performing schools has a relatively small
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performance elasticity.
It is not straightforward to assume that only the different observed traveled distances represent
different preferences. The cost of travel per unit of distance could be different for students living
in different areas of the city or for students from different backgrounds.  Andersson et al. (2012)
find that distance traveled to school by students 15 years old increased across Sweden between
2000 and 2006; as a series of school choice policies were introduced. The authors also find that
school choice may be a matter of preference for certain schools, but importantly, it might also be
a matter of time and space restrictions for families with fewer resources; that is, with less spatial
capital and a limited opportunity structure. Their results show that distance traveled to school has
increased on average since 2000, but that foreign-born students are traveling shorter distances,
except for those with highly educated parents. Shorter distances are also traveled by students
from families that are beneficiaries of social assistance programs and for disadvantaged
minorities.
There exists a consensus that traveling to school can imply a meaningful cost, especially in rural
areas. Even within urban areas the distance, as a proxy of cost of travel, can imply different levels
of access and choice (Cullen et al 2005). Evidence links an increase in the distance of the
commute between the home and the school with increased levels of choice; in the US (Aghzadian,
2009), Europe (Weber and Butler, 2007) and Latin America (Gomez et al., 2012). However,
students with lower performance and from lower socioeconomic status have been observed to
travel lower distances, other things equal (Hastings et al (2006) and Andersson et al (2012)). The
debate is open on whether this is an issue concerning personal preferences (Hastings et al, 2006)
or an issue of access (Andersson et al, 2012).
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2.4.2 Transit and ease of access
The current thesis rests on the assumption that available transportation is relevant for high school
students and that increasing its availability would modify the access students have to schools in
different parts of the city. To support this assumption the current subsection reviews the literature
linking transit availability and ease of access to schools. An important piece of evidence is the
Origin Destination Survey by INEGI (2007) for Mexico City. The survey concludes that 22 millions
trips are generated every day12. More than two thirds of all trips (67.5%) use exclusively public
transit, while 31% use private vehicles and the remaining 1.5% use a mix of public and private
means. Education represents the second largest reason for a trip13 following work commutes with
17.6% of all trips. Most of the study trips take place between 7:00am and 8:00 am, a “rush hour”
that concentrates 10.7% of all trips that take place during the day, making it the hour of the day
with the most travels being initiated. The time of day of most study-related trips would provide an
additional advantage to Metrobus, given that it has a designated lane and it is not subject to the
same level of traffic as private vehicles. The survey found a large variance in the duration of trips.
Trips using public transit that originated in a state, and stayed in the state (either the Federal
District or the State of Mexico) had an average duration of 28 minutes. Trips that originated in one
state and finished in the other state had an average duration of one hour and five minutes. The
survey did not disaggregate results for high school students.
The link between transit usage and accessibility by students in high school (14 – 18 years old)
has been recorded in developed countries where high school students are not allowed to drive.
This is the case in Japan (Alemu and Tsutsumi, 2011), Canada and the United States (O’Brien
and Gilbert, 2003) and Greece (Kamargianni et al. 2012). In the specific case of Greece
12 58% of them in the Federal District and the remaining 42% in the State of Mexico.
13 Associating trip from home to school and the trip to go back home.
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(Kamargianni et al. 2012) transit was the main mode of transportation for high school students
living in urban areas. O’Brien and Gilbert (2003) found that for teenagers from 12 to 18 years old
public transport trips to and from school increase with age, to become the most prevalent mode
by the age of around 16. Furthermore, in a study for Oregon (Yang et al. 2012) the introduction of
school choice policies was associated with longer distances traveled between the home and
school, lower percentage of students walking or cycling to school, and a higher percentage of
students using motorized modes of transport (cars or buses) even after controlling for the
observable individual characteristics of the students.
Guerra (2013) analyses the effect of a new subway line in Mexico City on travel mode. The author
finds a large increase in ridership from areas more intensely benefited by the new line (within 1
km of a station). She also finds that the most likely users of the new line are previous users of
transit who switch to more efficient modes. These two findings make a transit improvement a
phenomenon likely to be considered relevant for students deciding on their preferred route and
their estimated cost to travel to school, since they are unlikely to be using private vehicles due to
legal restrictions on driving or lack of access to a vehicle.
Another relevant question is whether a transit improvement can have an effect large enough to
be observed in student behavior. Given the lack of direct study in the existing education literature
I gather evidence on the effect of transit on labor market outcomes. Kawabata (2003) analyzes
job access and employment among low-skill auto-less workers in Los Angeles, Boston and San
Francisco. The analysis focuses on whether better transit access significantly increase job
opportunities. He finds that improvements in the transit-based job accessibility have significant
positive effects in the probability of being employed for low-skill workers. Furthermore, the effect
is twice as large among auto-less workers than among car owners. Similar results were found for
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the development of new transit. Fan et al. (2012) analyze the introduction of the first light rail line
in the Twin Cities of Minnesota. They calculate the number of jobs accessible for people living
within 400 meters of a transit stop before and after the new line was introduced. They find that
people being served by a light rail station experienced the largest benefits, gaining access to 53%
more low-paying jobs and 38% more middle-paying jobs. They concluded that the transit
improvement had an important equity component, further benefiting low-income workers seeking
low skill jobs.
Regarding changes in other areas of economic behavior Combs (2013) uses a difference in
difference analysis to examine the changes in vehicle-ownership brought about by the
introduction of the BRT system in Bogota, Colombia. In the preferred estimation the author finds
a negative correlation between the odds of vehicle ownership and BRT transit use service for
higher wealth households, and no effect for households with lower levels of wealth. From Yang et
al. (2012) and INEGI (2007) I infer that high school students in Mexico City are largely dependent
on transit to access schools outside a walking range. The observed link between job access and
transit (Kawabata , 2003, Fan et al. 2012) also leads me to think that transit has a relevant role in
school access, and that improvements could be highly relevant to students, particularly in areas
currently not served by mass transit (Metro or light rail).
2.5 Potential Side Effects of School Choice
31
The potential for efficiency gains through increased levels of choice has been presented above.
However, there have also been claims of potential negative side effects of choice policies. Some
evidence exists that the introduction of school choice policies can increase sorting of students
between public and private schools (Hsieh and Urquiola 2006) based on students’ performance.
The sorting can also take place between different neighborhoods. Gibson and Ashtana (2000)
analyze the relative performance of schools that share a catchment area in Manchester, UK,
before and after the education reform of 1997 in England and Wales. The reform changed
enrollment based on defined enrollment areas to an admission criterion disassociated from
geography.  The authors find that schools in the lower end of the performance distribution
experienced a fall in the percentage of students in the top 50% ranks of performance in the GCSE
test. They conclude that an increase in choice led to a polarization in results at the school level,
but are unable to make conclusions at the student level.
There are also observational studies linking school choice and self-separation on non-academic
dimensions. Ledwith and Clark (2007) focus on school attendance zones in Los Angeles. They
find that there is a strong correlation between the racial and ethnic composition of the school
attendance zone and that of the school located in it. However, the analysis suggests that ethnicity
is also a relevant factor of decision making. They find that for a 1% increase in the percent of
white school-age children living in an attendance zone, there is a 3.6% increase in white
enrollment in the neighborhood school, even after controlling for income and parental education.
They also find that the difference in ethnic composition between the neighborhood of residence
and the school attended increases as the student moves from elementary to middle and high
school, where there is higher liberty in terms of choice. The existence of increased polarization in
academic and non-academic dimensions will be explored as part of this project.
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In the three sections of the literature review I have gather evidence of the link between school
choice and the distance traveled between home and school. The existing research from the
United States, the United Kingdom, Chile and Sweden agrees in pointing out that policies that
increase school choice are accompanied by longer trips by most students. Furthermore, research
from Sweden, Chile and the United Sates find that students from disadvantaged backgrounds
tend to travel less. Whether this is related to difference in preferences or differences in access is
a point open to debate. On the other hand there is also strong indication in the literature of the
importance of transit for student at the high school level in different parts of the world. Specifically
for Mexico City it has been found that the majority of trips take place using transit, being “going to
school” one of the main reason for travel. The use of transit as the main mode of transportation
by high school students has been established in cities in Japan, the United States and Greece.
Borrowing from the literature in labor economics I find links between transit and access to the job
market, with strong effects for workers that do not own a car. The potential effects of greater
choice are still a subject of discussion, since efficiency gains may have to be weighted with
increases in segregation in academic or non-academic dimensions.
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Chapter 3. Context Overview
This chapter describes the context for the research questions. The first section describes in
detail the characteristics of the high school application process in Mexico City. The second
section follows by describing the databases that were used in the analysis. This section also
describes the different profile of applicants coming from private middle schools; since the match
analysis will be conducted only for students coming from public middle schools, for reasons to
be presented in this section. The third section presents descriptive statistics of the general
student population. The fourth, and last, section describes the process by which the Metrobus
lines were planned and introduced, and the descriptive statistics of the subsample of applicants
living in areas served by the new transit routes.
3.1 High School application process in Mexico City
Mexico City is home to over twenty million inhabitants and comprises 57 municipalities in three
states in the valley of Mexico (INEGI, 2010). Mexico City has an estimated GDP per head in
purchasing power parity of US $20,400. Every year close to 300,000 students apply to public high
schools through a centralized process. This section will describe the process of transition from
middle school (7th to 9th grade) to public high school (10th to 12th grade) in Mexico City.
In 1996 the nine existing public high school subsystems in the metropolitan area of Mexico City
adopted a common admissions process. This process is implemented annually by the Comisión
Metropolitana de Instituciones Públicas de Educación Media Superior14 (“COMIPEMS”). Before
14 COMIPEMS can be translated to English as the Metropolitan Commission of Public High-school Institutions.
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the existence of COMIPEMS, the process of application and admissions were specific to each of
the nine subsystems. In the current system any students wishing to enroll in a public high school
participates in the COMIPEMS annual process. Registration begins in February when material
explaining the process is distributed to all students in ninth grade (the last year of middle school).
When a student registers she submits a ranked list of the programs that she wants to attend and
in what school. In most schools there is only one program, with different tracks in vocational
schools the main exception. The students can list up to twenty options on their form. In June of
that year registered students take a comprehensive achievement test with 128 multiple-choice
questions. The exam covers verbal and mathematical skills and knowledge in the fields of history,
geography, mathematics, physics, chemistry, literature, biology and ethics. In July, after the exams
have already been scored, the process of assigning options for students begins.
For the first step of assignment each of the nine subsystems sets a maximum on the number of
students that it will accept at each high school. Second, students are ranked in descending order
according to their score in the COMIPEMS test. Students who failed to obtain a middle school
certificate or did not attend the exam (after registering) are disqualified. Then students are
allocated to their highest ranked school with spaces available based after higher achieving
students have been allocated. It is not uncommon to have “ties” in which the number of students
with the same COMIPEMS score seeking a position in a specific high school exceed the number
of available seats. In that case the school subsystem representative must decide on site if the
school will increase its announced capacity (taking all students in the tied group) or remain under-
subscribed, rejecting all students in the tied group. If by the time the student's turn arrives, all of
her preferred options are already fully subscribed she must wait until the automatic matching
process comes to an end. At the end of the automatic process students can select among schools
that still have available seats.
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The most demanded options normally have no seats available at the end of the first matching
round. This second round of selection takes several days and it is also based on the COMIPEMS
test score, with students with higher scores having a priority on selection. At the end of the process
students receive only one final offer that can only be exchanged for a seat in one of the schools
with seats available, if any, after the two rounds. It is important to emphasize that this process
leads me to analyze two different groups of schools. The first is the set of schools that the student
submits as his or her preferred options. These are the up to 20 schools listed by order of
preference that the students’ include in their registration form. I refer to these group as “preferred”
or “selected”, since the student is choosing them, in order, from a list of close to 400 schools. The
second is a set with a single school; the school that was allocated to the student at the end of the
COMIPEMS process. I call this allocated because it is the product of the preferences of the
student and the allocation mechanism. I refer to this school as “allocated” or “assigned”
throughout the thesis. It is important to acknowledge that this school is not being assigned by a
force outside of the control of the student, and that it is a direct consequence of the set of preferred
schools, his or her performance and a publicly-known allocation mechanism.
In Mexico, and therefore in Mexico City, all public high schools are tuition free. Students can
participate in the process several times (in different years) if they wish to do so. However, credits
earned in one subsystem can rarely be transferred to other subsystems. The data do not allow
information on identifying if a specific student has taken the test before. The age distribution (in
Table 1) indicates that only a minority of students could be repeated test takers. In the analysis
participants in adult-learning programs (above 25 year of age) are also excluded from the sample.
While students receive only one final offer in the COMIPEMS process’ students can opt not to
enroll. The intention of this study is to make statements on the characteristics of the schools the
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students selected and the school in which the students eventually enroll. For this reason the
analysis is restricted to students coming from public middle schools who are more likely to enroll
in their COMIPEMS allocated school (Huesca Reynoso, 2004) and who are less likely to have
access to private high schools. The next section will present a brief overview on the difference in
profile between students of public and private middle schools.
3.2 Profile of Private and Public Middle School Students
Like in many other countries in the OECD the private sector plays a relatively small role in
education. According to Musset (2012) the private sector represents approximately 10% of all the
students in Mexico. At a national level in 2013 8% of students attend a private institution at the
middle school level. The proportion more than doubles to 17.2% for high school students (INEE,
2013). These percentage are similar to those in the metropolitan area of Mexico City, where 6.7%
of students attend a private middle school, and 18.5% attend a private high school (Blanco et al.,
2014)
Blanco et al. (2014) analyze the academic trajectory of individuals 18 to 29 years old in Mexico
City metropolitan area. As part of their analysis they create a wealth index. The index includes
information on ownership of different assets (car, washing machine, etc…), years of schooling of
the parents and other relevant characteristics.  They divide the generated index in four levels of
socio-economic status (“SES”): Very low, low, medium and high. They find that 31% of high SES
individuals who attended high school did so in a private institution. More than twice as likely as
members of the other three groups (12%). The authors emphasize that among low and middle
SES individuals private institutions usually act as a “refuge” and are mainly sought by individuals
who could not access the public institutions. If this was the case in this thesis these students
37
would be in the data base as those with not allocated school, or students who did not take the
placement test despite being registered. The latter group is excluded from the analysis. Blanco et
al (2014) also find that 65% of people who attended a private middle school attended a private
high school. Only 10% of people who attended a public middle school attended a private high
school.
According to the study by Blanco et al. (2014) there are also important differences among
individuals with different SES in the rate of successful transition from one level of education to the
next. A translation of Table 3.6 from their book is reproduced below;
Probability of successfully transitioning from:
Primary to Secondary to HS to
SES Secondary HS College
Very
low 90% 58% 16%
Low 97% 73% 29%
Medium 99% 88% 38%
High 99% 94% 52%
Source: Blanco et al. (2014)
As mentioned the intention of this study is to make statements on the characteristics of the schools
the students selected and the school in which the students eventually enroll. For this reason the
analysis is restricted to students coming from public middle schools who are more likely to enroll
in their COMIPEMS allocated school. Only 35% (Blanco et al., 2014) of students from private
middle schools attend a public high school, making the chance of not enrolling in the allocated
school much greater if the students does not find it desirable. Given that 90% of individuals who
attended a public middle school and who eventually enrolled in high school will do so in a public
institution (Blanco et al., 2014) it is safe to say that the school option allocated via COMIPEMS to
public middle school students is highly relevant for their educational prospects. In addition they
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represent the great majority of the database (up of 94%)
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Description of data
The thesis uses three types of data: 1) Block shape files and street grid files for Mexico City, 2)
Census data from 2000, 2005 and 2010, 3) Administrative data from the COMIPEMs entrance
exam. The first type of data refers to geographic files necessary to perform location, distance and
travel analysis. The data was provided by INEGI. The second set of data comprises the
information collected by the National Census. This information is used to track the population
dynamics of the area before, during and after the study period. The census collects data on the
physical characteristics of the dwelling, years of schooling of the family members, ownership of
fix assets and household composition, among other characteristics. The census also asks
whether the residents have been living in the house for more than five and ten years, which is
helpful to identify differential migration patterns in different areas of the city.
This thesis uses administrative data compiled by COMIPEMS for the twelve admissions cycles,
from 2002 to 2013. The database contains student-level unidentified information from the
registration process and the exam itself. From the COMIPEMS exam registration process the
database includes: Colonia (neighborhood) of residence, date of birth, a unique middle school
identifier along with the grade point average attained (verified by the ministry of education); and
a list of up to 20 ranked school preferences. Before taking the exam, the student fills a background
questionnaire including information on family composition; participation in the labor market, study
habits, family income proxies and parental education among other variables. From the
COMIPEMS placement test itself the information includes the aggregate result, and the by-section
score. The allocated school in the first round and the final allocated school are also included in
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the data.
The address of the student up to the colonia level is used to geo-reference the data. Colonia is a
geographical division of urban municipalities. It usually refers to a neighborhood and has no
specific administrative implication. The average size of a colonia is about 30 blocks. However, the
size can vary significantly. Large public housing developments can constitute a colonia by
themselves, while less populated areas might lead to a colonia with a larger area but fewer
students. Distance calculations between colonia and schools are done by calculating the route
distance between the centroid of the colonia and the location of the schools, which are known
precisely.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
This section includes the descriptive statistics of the geocoded COMIPEMS data, as well as the
maps related to the main variables of interest.  Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation
of the main variables. About half of the sample is male, with an average of 15 years old. The large
majority of students (94%) comes from public middle schools. Only 33% of households have a
car, which will be relevant in the hypothesis in Chapter 4.  While students can list up to 20 options
in their registration form, on average, only 9.5 options are listed. Close to one third of students
selects the closest15 school in their top three options. On average students are allocated to a
school 7.3 km from home, a distance that is shorter than the estimated average distance to the
15 As mentioned before the distance is calculated based on the centroid of the colonia to the school. There might be
more than one school that is the “closest” schools in different areas of the colonia. Therefore closest school here
refers to the group of up to three schools which differ in distance by no more than 500m. On average this
represent one and a half schools by colonia.
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top-three preferred schools, which is 8 km.
Graph 1 shows the distribution of the scores in the placement test in standard deviations (“SD”)
from the mean. While the distribution does not differ meaningfully from the normal distribution,
there are two interesting features worth highlighting. The first is the relatively fat lower tail, with
the mass of results between minus one SD and minus two standard deviations exceeding the
mass of the normal distribution. This is likely a reflection of the relatively low minimum standards
for exiting middle school and accessing the bottom of the high school distribution in Mexico City.
Based on the analysis of the data, most of the students in this performance group opt for a
technical school or for an academic-track high school in the State of Mexico state system (one of
the three states comprising Mexico City). Before 2013 students were required a minimum of 31
correct answers in the placement test (that has 128 questions) to be allocated to a high school.
This was considered to reflect the minimum required knowledge to start high school. This implied
that many of the students below 2 SD in the years previous to 2013 were not allocated to a high
school and are excluded from the choice analysis. In 2013 this restriction was lifted.
The second feature is the thickness of the upper tail in the area above one and a half and two
standard deviations. This reflects the high degree of competition to access elite high schools in
the UNAM and IPN tracks. These tracks are linked to the two largest national universities, and
graduates receive preferential admission into the respective institutions. For some high schools
in the UNAM system there can be up to 15 requests for every seat available (COMIPEMS, 2014),
making them accessible only to students in the top quartile of the score distribution. As mentioned
before, close to 94% of students in COMIPEMS come from public middle schools. However, the
proportion of students coming from private middle schools applying and being allocated to the
UNAM and IPN tracks is more than twice the proportions for the whole sample.
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Map 1 presents the average household monthly income of COMIPEMS test takers by colonia in
real Mexican pesos of year 2000. The map shows high income areas (in dark blue) in the urban
core of the city and along a North-South axis crossing the center of the city. It could be said that
income seems to decrease with the distance to this “high-income axis”, with the lower income
areas located in the farthest east part of the city (in red). In line with the mean and standard
deviation in distance presented in Table 1 we see in Map 2 that students from most neighborhoods
attend schools in a distance of 5km to 7.5 km. However, students living in the outskirts of the city
are matched to schools that can be located more than 15km from their residence.
Map 2 also shows the location of the schools across the city which are marked with black dots.
While the location of the students is presented at the colonia level, the location of schools is
precise and set to the entrance of the school. Map 3 and Map 4 show a very similar pattern to the
configuration seen in the income map. However, they respectably represent average score in the
COMIPEMS test by students in the colonia and the average score of the school in which students
living in this colonia were allocated. Both of these maps are presented in standard deviations from
the yearly mean. Students living in higher income areas in the center of the city tend to obtain
higher scores and be allocated to higher score schools; with the opposite being true for those
living in poorer neighborhoods in the outskirts of the city. However, as we see in Map 5 there are
a large number of students with COMIPEMS scores above one and one and a half standard
deviations above the mean living all across the city, and not exclusively in high-income or central
areas.
3.4 The introduction of Metrobus in Mexico City
Rising rates of vehicle ownership, weak transportation infrastructure development and
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institutional impediments have led major cities in many developing countries to a path of
increasing congestion and deteriorating environmental and safety conditions (Gwilliam, 2003).  It
is in this context that Bus Rapid Transit (“BRT”) originated. First developed in Brazil and later
adopted in Colombia, it quickly positioned itself as a reliable alternative to other modes of transit
(Combs, 2013). The BRT introduces four innovations that makes it similar to a light rail system,
increasing reliability, capacity and efficiency: 1) Fixed closed stations, 2) The use of high capacity
buses, 3) Exclusively dedicated lanes and 4) fare collection at the station before boarding. The
introduction of a BRT line in Mexico City was first announced as an option under consideration
between the authorities of the two main states of the metropolitan area of Mexico City in
September 2002 (Adalid, 2002). At the time there were no announcements of the routes under
discussion and the BRT was presented as one of the options being discussed to alleviate
congestion in the city. A plan for the development of 6 routes was presented a year later in
September 2003 (Adalid, 2003) at the time only the route of Line 1 was defined. The unveiling of
the routes, construction and beginning of operations has been phased in periods of approximately
two years per line. As of the 1st of January 2015 there were five lines in operation. The new
system also came with an increase in fares from 3.5 to 5 pesos per trip, and up to 6 pesos in
2014. The dates that each route was announced and started operations are the following. Note
that Line 4 is excluded from the analysis, for being an airport shuttle bus. The routes, stations and
the area served by each line are shown in Map 7.
Line Announced Started Operations Length
LINE 1 Sep 2003 Feb 2006 30 Km
LINE 2 Dec 2006 Dec 2009 20 Km
LINE 3 Mar 2010 Feb 2011 17 Km
LINE 5 Jan 2011 Nov 2013 10 Km
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3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
The data used for the transit analysis is the COMIPEMS and INEGI data in the areas benefited
by the new transit lines. The group of students under analysis are those living within one kilometer
of a station of the four bus rapid transit lines being analyzed. Students living within a kilometer of
a station are considered to be favored by the transit improvements and are more likely to use the
Metrobus once they start operations16. Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of students living
in areas benefited by each line. The table shows the values for students that applied in the years
2002 – 2005, before the first line started operations.
The proportion of male students and their age is no different between the areas benefited by the
different lines. There are also no meaningful differences in the rate of students working and the
percentage of student receiving a need or merit base transfer. However, there are differences in
other important observable characteristics. Mother’s schooling is close to half a year higher for
students served by Line 1, they come from households with higher income (around one thousand
pesos) and are about 5% less likely to come from a public middle school.  Students served by
Line 3 are seven percent less like to come from household that own a car, they are the less likely
group to select one of their closest schools in their top three options (31%) and consequently they
have the highest measured distance between their home and their first three selected options
(5.2 km), although the difference is relatively small in standard deviations (0.214 SD). Students
benefited by Line 1 submit fewer high school choices when they register, close to half a school
less. (7.9 options listed versus 8.5-8.7 for the other lines) and get about four points higher scores
in the COMIPEMS test, which represents about a quarter of standard deviation. In general we
16 This follows the patterns of transit usage described for Mexico City in Guerra (2013).
44
observe that students in areas that will be benefited by Line 1 perform better and come from more
advantaged socio economic backgrounds that students that will be served by the other lines.
Students that will be served by Line 2, Line 3 and Line 5 appear to be relatively similar between
them. They come from more disadvantaged backgrounds (lower income and less educated
mothers) and they are more likely to be under-matched. Students living close to Line 2 have the
highest level of under-matching in the analysis group, and are also the most likely to select their
closest school. How these two variables react to the introduction of new transit lines is of particular
interest for the thesis, since applying to the closest schools might be a strong reflection of the
incapacity to access other, better, high school options. It is also worth highlighting that Line 2
benefits the largest number of students, about seven thousand students17 a year in the 2002 –
2013 period. The importance of these differences in our analysis is addressed in the next section
and in detail in the Graphs 5 to 10. Graphs 5 to 10 reflect the trends before and after lines were
introduced by area of influence.
17 82,172 students lived in areas benefited by Line 2 between 2002 and 2013. Dividing 82,172 / 12 provides an
average of 6,916 students per year.
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Chapter 4. Under-matching in the Public High School System in Mexico City.
The following chapter analyzes the extent and patterns of under-matching in the public high
school application process in Mexico City. The chapter contributes to fill one of the voids in the
literature, given that no specific study on under-matching in this context was found. As specified
in Chapter 3 this analysis is for public middle school students; focusing on the schools they
selected as their preferred options when they registered for the exam, and the allocated school,
once the placement test has been taken. The chapter is organized as follows; Section 4.1 contains
the definition of the concept of under-matching and the estimation of the students being under-
matched. Section 4.2 presents the result from the logistic regression of the probability of being
under-matched on several observable characteristics of the students and their context. Section
4.3 provides a summary and the conclusions of the chapter.
4.1 Under-matching Analysis for Public High Schools in Mexico City
Students seeking to apply to public high schools in Mexico City have experienced a large degree
of school choice for close to twenty years. Whether this freedom has led students to attend
schools in line with their academic potential is an important question. Furthermore, since
undermatching can be detrimental for students’ performance it is also a performance and
efficiency issue (Bowen, Chingos and McPherson, 2009, Sacerdote, 2011). Matching is also a
relevant equity issue, since students from poorer backgrounds are more likely to be under-
matched (Hoxby and Turner, 2013) making it a heavy burden for academic success for those
already facing the most difficulties. This section analyzes the level of under-matching in the
application and assignment process and the observable variables associated with this
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phenomenon in Mexico City.
Following Roderick et al. (2008) I define “Correct-match” to describe whether a student enrolled
in a school that match her qualifications, and that has the maximum selectivity level the student
would likely have been accepted to, given his or her previous qualifications. “Under-matching”
would be when a student enrolls in a school below his or her school qualifications. The definition
of correct match depends on two characteristics, the level of qualifications and selectivity. In order
to determine the relative levels of selectivity Roderick et al. (2008) create a matrix of the minimum
required composite ACT score (an standardized test) and GPA required to have a high probability
of being accepted in a the college. The probability of being accepted is determined via a logistic
model. The universities to in the sample of analysis are divided in five categories: Very selective,
selective, somewhat selective, non-selective four year institutions and two-year colleges. From
this general categorization it follows that the classification in each group represents a spectrum
of colleges, and matching does not necessarily refer to an exact match of students and college
ACT or GPA.
As seen in the literature review, a lot of the existing work has been done in the US high-school to
college transition. Papers such as Cullen et al. (2005), Cullen et al (2006) and Roderick et al.
(2008) base their definition of under-matching on the whether students enrolled in a college with
a level of selectivity below the maximum level of selectivity they could have attended. To
determine the set of colleges a student could have attended the first step is to generate a logistic
regression on observable characteristics of the students (such as GPA and ACT score) to assess
the minimum required combination to get accepted in this college. Just to give an example, in
Roderick et al. (2008) in the matrix presented by the authors a very selective college refers to any
institution requiring an ACT score above 24 points and to have above a 3.0 GPA. So if a student
with ACT score above 24 and a GPA above three applies only to colleges deemed somewhat-
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selective or non-selective she would be considered under-matched, given that she could have
gained admission into a very selective institution.
The high school application process in Mexico City differs in two important ways to the US college
application process. First is that students do not know their COMIPEMS score when they select
their preferred set of schools (as opposed to including the ACT score to apply to college). The
second is that the cutoffs in COMIPEMS score for all of the schools are know with certainty after
the allocation has taken place, with cutoffs from different schools going from 31 points to 105
points (over 128). The development of the definition of under-match for this analysis intends to
capture these two differences in the way it is framed and estimated.
For any potential student the set of available schools can be obtained by comparing her score
and the admission cutoff of each high school. However, retrospective knowledge of the set of
schools the student could have attended could lead to a misleading comparison between her
allocated school and the best school that could have been attended based on her score and the
final cutoffs by school. If we were to run this exercise we would find that 92.5% of students could
have attended a school with in a higher average entrance score than the one being allocated.
This misleading comparison overlooks the fact that at the time of selecting preferred options the
student does not know her own score or the scores and preferences of other students, which will
eventually form the observed cutoffs. A more reasonable comparison is the quartile in which the
average entrance score in the school is in the overall score distribution. While the exact cutoff of
a certain school might change from one year to the next the quartile in which the score lands is
relatively constant over time. This can be verified in Table 2 which shows the tabulation of quartile
of average score comparing the current to the previous year. This table comprises the changes
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through the twelve years of the sample. In all between 85% - 95% of schools remain in the same
quartile of performance as the previous year, with almost all of the changes being one quartile
above or below. Students can therefore assess with reasonable certainty the relative level of
selectivity and peer quality of each school based on the scores from previous year, information
which is publicly available and included in their application package.
Even if the relative selectivity and peer quality can be assessed with some certainty it is also
important to analyze if students can assess their own future performance in the COMIPEMS test
at the time of selecting their preferred school options. To this end it is pertinent to analyze the
work of Bobba and Frisancho (2014). In their paper they set an intervention that seeks to provide
students with relevant information about their own ability in order to observe its effects on beliefs
and, ultimately, on choices. They provide students with a mock version of the admission exam
used by the COMIPEMS and assign a random portion of them to receive feedback on their
performance prior to the submission of school preference rankings. Since taking the mock exam
may, in itself, alter behaviors and school choices, they also collect information on a group of
students who did not take the mock exam. The research takes place in schools in areas of high
poverty in Mexico City, based on the hypothesis that students in this areas should be more likely
to benefit from the information intervention.
As part of their experiment they gather data on students’ prior belief, their performance in the
mock test and on the final COMIPEMS test. In order to collect their prior beliefs students are
provided with twenty beans and are asked to allocated them in bins that represent 15-point
windows in accordance to how likely they consider this score. This method allows them to build a
smooth normal-like distribution of expected scores. This leads to an average expected score of
74 points (out of 128) with a standard deviation of 18 points. One of their findings is that students
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are in general overconfident of their future performance. In the real COMIPEMS test (both in
treatment and control) the average score is 65 points with a standard deviation of 19 points. A 9
points difference represent about half a standard deviation in the sample18. Using the 2013 data
from the current thesis we observe that the interquartile score difference is 17 points, or about 1.8
times the difference between the estimated and the actual score. So while students might be
overconfident they can, in general, provide a reasonable assessment of their quartile of
performance.
As mentioned above the definition of correct match depends on two characteristics, the level of
qualifications and selectivity. The persistent relative selectivity at the school level described in
Table 2 leads me to assume that students can determine selectivity and quality at the quartile of
performance level before submitting their preferred options. Based on the findings of Bobba and
Frisancho (2014) and on the overall score distribution I assume that students can, with reasonable
certainty, assess the minimum quartile of their own performance and, if anything, some of them
might project that they will score at a level belonging to the quartile above their actual score. I
therefore proceed to define correct match as being allocated to a school with an average entrance
score in the same quartile or higher of the score distribution as the actual score obtained by the
student. I therefore define being under-matched as having a COMIPEMS score in a quartile above
the quartile of the average entrance score of the high school allocated in at the end of the process.
Table 3 shows the tabulation of test scores of students and the average entrance score in the
allocated school. Both tabulations refer to quartiles of the aggregate distribution by year. The table
includes the totality of students that were allocated to a high school in the twelve years of analysis.
So for example, row 1, column 2, represents the number of students with scores in the first
18 The performance in Bobba and Frisancho (2014) are in line with the 2013 data (the year of the intervention) used
in the current thesis. For 2013 the COMIPEMS score has a mean of 72 pts with standard deviation of 19 points.
Considering that Bobba and Frisancho (2014) focused on low-income students it understandable we observe a
lower mean.
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quartile, the lowest, in the performance score that were allocated to schools with average scores
in the second quartile. From this table we can calculate the level of under-matching as the total
number of students under the diagonal. In total 464,657 students were under-matched in the
period of analysis. That is, they were allocated to schools at least one quartile below their test
result.
This estimation allows us to measure this phenomenon by proportions. In the last twelve years
one of every five students was matched to a school below his or her academic skills, potentially
compromising their future performance and their likelihood of graduation. It is important to
understand that all students being under-matched could have attended a school with average
entrance scores in, or above, the same quartile of their COMIPEMS score. In Table 4 we see the
school with the maximum level of selectivity the student could have attended based on her final
COMIPEMS score minus 4 (a quarter of a standard deviation). To calculate this I search for the
school in the highest performance quartile with a minimum entrance score from the previous year
that was below the final COMIPEMS score minus 4 (a quarter of a standard deviation) both the
year of application and the year previous. Table 4 shows that all students could have attended at
least a school with average entrance score in the same quartile as its own score. Table 4
represents the result of one individual switching, and not the general equilibrium if all students
switched to the highest-quartile school possible. If this were the case we would observe perfect
sorting with almost every student in the diagonal.
It is important to inquire on the observable variable associated with under-matching in order to
hypothesize about the potential causes of this phenomenon. A first exploratory analysis is to
assess if the students who under-matched applied to a school in line with their potential. Students
may be denied access to more selective schools because of a lack of openings and may have
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actually applied to school in a matching quartile, but been assigned to a lower quartile. Of all
students who under-matched 19% did not apply to any school in the same quartile of performance
as themselves for their first five most preferred options. Further, more in Table 5 we see that 65%
of them submitted a list of their five most preferred schools that was not ordered in terms of
selectivity (quartiles of average performance).
As seen in Lucas and Mbiti (2012), Ajayi (2011) and Lai et al. (2009) this effectively eliminates the
requested option, since seats are first allocated to students with higher scores. For example,
assume a student list a school A (in the 4th quartile) as the 2nd option and a school B (in the 3rd
quartile) as the first option. The allocation mechanism will first look for a seat available in school
B, and will only try to match the student with school A if school B is filled by the time the student’s
allocation turn comes. However, since school A is more selective than B it will run out of sets
before school B does, so given this set of ordered preferred options we would never expect to
see the student allocated to school A. If we look at the same descriptive statistics (in Table 6) for
students that did not under-match we can see that there are large differences, particularly
comparing the first three schools. Of students that under-matched 40.6% did not list their first
three options in order of selectivity. This behavior was present only in 26.1% of those who did not
under-matched.
In Tables 5 and 6 we see that the percentage of students making a “mistake” by not ordering their
preferred schools based on their selectivity is larger among students that ended up under-
matching. This finding leaves me to conclude that this is part of the reason why students under-
match, in line with the findings of Lucas and Mbiti (2012). However, it is unclear if this captures
all, or most, of the variation. In Map 6 we observe the percentage of students under-matched by
colonia in Mexico City. We observe that in the central areas of the city the percentage of under-
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matched student is exclusively in the 10% - 15% and 15% to 20% ranges; while the rate in the
outer areas of the city can reach values above 30%, with 20% - 25% and 25% - 30% being the
predominant categories. This shows that under-matching has a strong geographical dimension.
Comparing Map 6 and Map 1 (average income by colonia) leads us to think that under-matching
is also associated with income, as outer areas of the city tend to concentrate poorer households.
4.2 Logistic Analysis of Under-matching.
In order to parse the effect of different observable variables I perform a logistic regression on the
likelihood of being under-matched. This specification was preferred because the variable of
interest takes the value of zero or one depending on whether the student is or not under-matched.
The logistic regression is of the form;
( ) = 1( ) + 1
Where π(x) takes the value of 1 if the student is under-matched and zero otherwise. t is a vector
of indicative variables for year. Xi represents a matrix of observable characteristics of the student.
Table 7 shows the results of two different logistic regressions, in odds ratios, for two different
periods, based on data availability. Column one covers the whole period of study (2002 – 2013).
Column two covers 2004 to 2013 and includes the variable “Family owns a car”, an indicator of
auto ownership. Consistently across the two columns we observe similar estimations for all
variables. Males and older students are more likely to be under-matched. Males specifically are
40% more likely to be under-matched than women everything else constant. Under-matching is
not associated with mother’s schooling (measured in years) and with being recipient of a need-
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base transfer, after controlling for the other factors. Receiving a merit-based transfer is negatively
associated with under-matching. This is intuitive, since higher performance students are more
likely to receive this transfer. Being a beneficiary of the program might indicate an intrinsic higher
valuation for education, or a better knowledge of the institutional processes of application, since
these students have, necessarily, at least being subject to the application process for the
scholarship. It is important to remember that all public high schools are tuition-free. However,
there are different cash transfer and scholarship programs that are intended to provide economic
support for students and their families. Students that are working are around 13% more likely to
be under-matched, this is a relevant finding for about 9% of the sample. In column two we observe
that car ownership are associated to with lower probability of being under-matched, although it
should be noted that this variable has a small estimated relation, with an odd ratio very close to
one.
The variables related to the application process itself are all significant. The number of high
schools listed in the application form is negatively associated with being under-matched. This is
highly intuitive given that students that list more options might be more aware of their different
possibilities, but also because the most demanded options rarely have seats available during the
second stage of the matching process. Therefore, students who are not matched in the first round
because all their listed options were filled at the time their turn arrive will be forced to choose
among less selective options. Selecting the closest school to the home in one of the first three
preferred options also increases the likelihood of being under-matched, by about 8%. The largest
effect is not listing the three most preferred school options by level of selectivity, with an odd ratio
close to 1.8 in both specifications. As mentioned before, this “mistake” has been associated to
income and parental background in the past, and it is likely to be driving the insignificant relation
between mother’s schooling and being under-matched.
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In Map 6 we saw that different areas of the city had different proportions of student under-
matched. This difference can be partially explained by differences in income. As we see in the
logistic regression car ownership, an income proxy, is significantly associated with the likelihood
of being under-matched. However, there are also geographical components not explained by the
other variables included in the analysis. The average score in the COMIPEMS test in the colonia
(neighborhood) of residence is a significant explanatory variable. In the preferred estimation that
includes car ownership the relation is actually clearer, with a lower odds ratio and p-value. This is
the case even after controlling for the characteristics of the high school placement test application
form submitted by each student. This opens the door to several questions regarding peer effects
and potential endogeneity in the residential selection process, associated with information and
the value attributed to education. In line with the finding of Hastings et al. (2006) students who
select their closest school are more likely to be under-matched. Hastings et al. (2006) associate
this to differences in the allocated utility to convenience and school quality. In section five I will
argue that the observed behavior can also be explained in part by differences in the ability of
physically accessing a school in line with the student’s ability. Apparently opposite to this
argument is that distance to a “quality” school, defined as a school in the fourth quartile of the
score distribution, is not significant to explain the probability of under-matching. I argue that
distance is not the relevant measure, but ease of access, once transportation options are
considered.
4.3 Conclusions of the Under-matching Analysis
Enrolling in an academic institution that matches the student’s level of qualification is key for future
academic success (Bowen, Chingos and McPherson, 2009, Rodrick et al., 2008). Different
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studies have contributed into coining the concept of under-matching, as enrolling in a school
below the level of qualifications and selectivity a student could achieve. I study the results of the
open enrollment policy currently in place in Mexico City. I transfer the theoretical developments in
research from the United States context to analyze the potential frictions arising in the application
process. One of the strongest findings in the existing literature is that both information and
financial constraints play an important role in under-matching (Hoxby and Turner 2013).
In the current analysis I find that around twenty percent of all students taking the COMIPEMS
exam between 2002 and 2013 were under-matched. The level of under-matching differs
significantly between different neighborhoods (colonias) in Mexico City. A logistic regression on
the probability of being under-matched on different student characteristics confirmed that: 1)
Being under-matched is strongly related to the student behavior during the application process,
particularly on how many, and in what order the student selects his or her preferred schools; 2)
The phenomenon has a geographical component, even after controlling for the student behavior
during the application process. Observable variables that had a negative association with under-
matching were car ownership and receiving a merit-based transfer. Variables positively
associated with the probability of under-matching were age, middle school GPA, working at the
time of the placement test, applying to the closest school, being a male and not listing the
preferred schools in order of selectivity. After adjusting for these variables the average score in
the placement test in the neighborhood of residence was a significant predictor of the likelihood
of under-matching. This points out to potentially strong peer effects, residential endogenous
sorting or to other unobservable variables related to the built environment and the neighborhood
characteristics. A review of the maps presented as of now leads me to believe that a relevant
neighborhood characteristic, previously unexplored in the literature, is transit availability. This will
be the topic in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5. The Effect of Transportation on School Choice and Under-Matching.
The following chapter analyzes the effect of transit improvements on the characteristics of the
schools selected as preferred at the time of applying, on the characteristics of the schools
allocated to them and on the likelihood of under-matching. The chapter is organized as follows;
Section 5.1 introduces the methodology. Section 5.2 contains the analysis of the data and the
result from difference in difference analysis. Section 5.3 includes an interpretation of the results
and the potential mechanisms behind them.
5.1 Methodology.
The objective of this section is to introduce the methodological dimension of the difference in
difference analysis that will presented later in the chapter. The objective of this analysis is to
assess the effect of the development of four new bus rapid transit lines in a series of variables
related to the high school allocation process in Mexico City. As mentioned in section 3.3 I use the
data from 12 years of applications to public high schools in Mexico City. These cross-sections of
data include information on the students’ background, their stated, and ranked, preferred set of
high schools and the institution in which they received an offer to enroll as a result of the allocation
process. The data is desegregated to the student level and can be geo-located to the colonia
(neighborhood) level. It is based on the geo-location of data that I delineate the individuals
benefited by the new transit lines. I define as benefited all the students living within a kilometer of
a station, once the line starts operations.
I use this setting to compute the Difference in Difference estimates of the effect of the introduction
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of Metrobus in the benefited colonias. There are two groups of variables of interest: The first is
the variables related to the characteristics of the set of schools that students list as preferred in
their application process. The second set refers to the characteristics of the school allocated to
the students and the likelihood of being under-matched.
To formalize the causal relationships of interest it is convenient to introduce some notation. For
simplicity at this time assume we are analyzing only the effect of one line, before and after it starts
operation on one variable of interest. In reality I analyze four lines opening in different years, more
details of this will come at the end of the section. Let Y0ist be the variable of interest for a student
living in colonia s, in period t that has no access to the Metrobus system and Y1ist be the variable
of interest for a student living in colonia s, in period t that has access to the Metrobus system.
These two potential outcome are useful to have in mind, because the causal effect of the Metrobus
line would be
−
In practice. However, we only observe one or the other. For example in 2008 we only observe
Y1ist for individuals living in areas benefited by Line 1. As stated in Angrist and Pischke (2008) the
key of the Difference in Difference setup is the assumed additive structure of outcomes in no-
treatment (control) areas. More specifically[ | , ] = +
This equation tells us that in the absence of the transit improvement the variable of interest is
determined by a time-invariant area effect and a year effect that is common across all areas. This
setting leads the causal relation of interest to be of the form
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[ − | , ]
Assuming that this is a constant, to be denoted , we could set an estimation strategy of the form= + + + (1)
Where Dst is a dummy for areas benefited by a Metrobus line after the line opens. From here we
can get[ | = , = ] − [ | = , = ]= , − ,
and[ | = , = ] − [ | = , = ]= , − ,
Then our population difference in difference is= , − , − ( , − , ) (2)
The causal effect of interest in this case can be described as a post-treatment comparison minus
the pre-treatment comparison of the variable of interest. This can be estimated using the sample
analog of the population variables. Equation (1) can also be estimated in the regression
framework through an interaction. Let “line” be a dummy to denote the area benefited by the
Metrobus line and “post” a dummy for the years after the Metrobus line started service, then we
can estimate through an interaction of “line” and “post” in the form= + + + ( ∙ ) + (3)
The interactions measures the difference in slopes across two levels of another variable, leading
to the same results as our estimation in Equation 2. For our estimation to identify the average
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treatment effect I am relying on a series of assumptions, which are important to acknowledge. It
is also important to assess if there is evidence to support these assumption or if, on the contrary,
there are reasons to believe the assumptions are being violated. The main assumption is that
unobserved characteristics that could be relevant for the effect of the transit improvement have
the same distribution across time points and treatment groups, or( | , ) = 0
To build the case that this assumption holds I do three things. The first is that I am limiting the
analysis to areas that were eventually served by a Metrobus lines, all of them in a six years period.
Large public works, such as transit improvements, are unlikely to be random. They are targeted
to areas with a potential for further development, areas of high economic activity, or important
axis of travel among many other reasons that could interact with the school choice process. The
second element is to review the trends in the variables of interest before the introduction of
Metrobus lines. An important assumption in the difference in difference methodology is that in the
absence of the treatment we would have seen the same change in both groups. A way to address
this assumption is to look at past trends, if the groups have not behaved similarly in the past
(previous to any treatment) there is no reason to assume that they would have behaved the same
way in the absence of treatment. The complete set of graphs for the six variables of interest can
be found in Graphs 5 to 10. In these graphs we see that previous to 2006 the students living in
the four areas under analysis exhibit very similar behavior for the variables of interest, which is
reassuring. The main exception to this claim is the percentage of students under-matched in
colonias served by Metrobus line 5. The percentage of students increases substantially from 2005
to 2008 while the value for colonias served by the other lines is going down. This could be related
to the crowding out of students living close to Line 5, by student living closer to the newly open
Line 1. In 2009, and onwards, the percentage of students under-matched in areas served by Line
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5 decreases much more than for other lines, which, if anything should bias the estimated result
to zero. As a third element to support the assumption above, I include as controls a series of
observable characteristics that are unlikely to change due to the introduction of the Metrobus.
Namely: Age, gender, family income, being a recipient of a need-base transfer program, mother’s
schooling, average GPA in middle school at the colonia level the year before the Metrobus line
started operations, the area (in km2) of the colonia, year fixed effects and average score in
COMIPEMS at the colonia level. Naturally introducing these observable characteristics does not
guarantee that other unobservable characteristics cannot bias the results. However, they allow
for a more precise estimation and help tackle the bias that would be caused from leaving them
out of the regression. In addition I restrict the analysis to students coming from public middle
schools, who listed more than three schools in their list of preferred schools and who were
allocated to a school at the end of both rounds of the matching process
For simplicity I have only presented equations for the one-treatment and two-period scenario to
describe the estimation strategy. However, we are dealing with multiple colonias that get access
to the Metrobus system at different times. For clarity I present below the specific regressions
being estimated. I estimate the following equation for the effects of Metrobus on continuous
variables,
= + + + ( ∙ ) + + +
(4)
I use the logit form of Equation (4) for the estimation of the effect on the variables of interest that
only take values of zero and one. For Line 1 line is a dummy with value one for colonias in the
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benefited area of Line 1, and value zero for colonias that are only benefited by Lines 2, 3 or 5.
The variable post is also a dummy with value one for observations between 2006 and 2009, and
value zero for observations before 2005. Observations after 2009 were not included, as Line 2
came into service in late 2009 leading to a potential anticipation effect on students living in the
area benefited by Line 2 and who applied that year. For Line 2 line is a dummy with value one for
colonias in the benefited area of Line 2, and value zero for colonias that are only benefited by
Lines 1, 3 or 5. The variable post is also a dummy with value one for observations between 2010
and 2013, and value zero for observations before 2006. The analysis was also conducted
separately for students by three levels of achievement. Low achievement students are those with
a score in the COMIPEMS test below minus half a standard deviation from the mean. Medium
achievement students are those with COMIPEMS score within half a standard deviation from the
mean. High achievement students are those above half a standard deviation from the mean. All
the groups were created based on normalized scores using the yearly means and standard
deviations of COMIPEMS scores. A graphic representation of this can be seen in Graph 2.
5.2 The effect of transit improvements on student outcomes
I present results of the average impact of living in an area benefited by transit across all students
living in the area. I also explore possible heterogeneous treatment effects across students in
different levels of performance in the COMIPEMS placement test. I analyze two groups of
variables: The first is the variables related to the characteristics of the set of schools that students
list as preferred in their application process. Among the first group of variables we have
A) The route distance to the first three most preferred options,
B) Probability of including the closest school in the first most preferred options
C) The probability of submitting the first three most preferred schools ranked by their
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selectivity
The second set refers to the characteristics of the school allocated to the students and the
likelihood of being under-matched. Among the second group of variables we have
D) The difference (in standard deviations) between the average score of the allocated school
and the student’s own admission score.
E) The standard deviation of the admission scores in the allocated school,
F) The number of students in the allocated school
G) The probability of being under-matched
The results of the analysis for these two groups of variables are presented in Table 9 and 10
respectively. Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. The dependent variable
of the regression differs by columns. In both cases the tables are divided in two panels. The top
panel, the first four rows, shows the effect of Line 1. The bottom panel, rows five to eight, shows
the effect of Line 2. In each case the specific rows within the panel reflect the results for different
subsets of the student population. The first row shown the results for all students. The subsequent
rows present the effects for a breakdown of the student population by their performance in the
COMIPEMS placement test. In each cell of the table I report the main estimate of interest ( in
Equation 4) using ordinary least squares regression, for all continuous variables, and a logistic
regression for binary outcomes. I also report a clustered standard error at the colonia level in
parentheses, including year fixed effects.
The first panel of each table presents the effect of living in an area benefited by Line 1, comparing
the variable of interest before and after Line 1 started service between the students living in areas
benefited by Line 1 (treated) and students living in areas benefited by Lines 2, 3 and 5 (controls).
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The latter group acts as control since at the time Line 1 started operations, and for the first three
years, the student living in these areas were not yet benefited by a transit improvement. The
analysis of Line 2 follows the same logic, comparing the values of variables of interest before and
after Line 2 started service. In this case students living in areas served by Line 2 are considered
as treated, while students living in areas served by Lines 1, 3 and 5 are used as control.
The analysis of the first group of variables tell us the extent to which being benefited by transit
affects the students’ school application behavior. The results are presented in Table 9. In the first
panel we see that Line 1 did not affect the likelihood of applying to the closest school or the route
distance to the most preferred options. The lack of effect in these two variables should not be
surprising; looking at Map 1 we can observe that Line 1 served mainly middle and middle-high
income areas, where transit might be less likely to be used (due to private car ownership) and
where students were less likely to be constrained by transportation restrictions.
It is interesting to observe a negative significant coefficient for the probability of listing the three
most preferred school in accordance to their selectivity. On average students living in areas
benefited by Line 1 were 10% less likely to list these options in order after the Metrobus started
operations (going from around 60% to 54%). This was mainly driven by students in the middle of
the performance distribution, who were 23% less likely to list their first three options in order of
selectivity. It is unclear why we would observe such a large response among this group, with no
similar reaction by another group neither in the analysis of Line 1 nor in the analysis of Line 2.
The second panel of Table 9 presents the results for students living in areas benefited by Metrobus
Line 2.  Column one shows that on average students in the benefited areas listed schools that
were 0.2 Km farther in their three most preferred options. The effect was positive but not
significant for students at the top of the performance distribution. The effects were significant for
students in the middle (0.24 Km) and lower part (0.20 Km) of the performance distribution. While
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this change was relatively small, 200 meters, or a couple of city blocks it is important to notice
that the increase in distance traveled came along with a change in the direction traveled. In map
9 we observe that schools outside of the route of Line 2 were less preferred, while those close to
stations increased their relevance for the treated group. In column 2 we observe that there is no
significant effect on the probability of listing the three most preferred option in order of selectivity.
A priori I expected small positive effects, guided by the idea that additional transit could modify
the access to information, leading to better school-selection “techniques”. However, I find no
evidence of this in the results. Column three shows the results for the likelihood of applying to one
of the closest schools as one of the most preferred high school options. No significant effect is
found for the complete sample. The sole subgroup with significant results (at a 10% level of
statistical significance) is the students in the lower part of the performance distribution. Low
COMIPEMS score students were 16% less likely to apply to their closer schools as their most
desired option. This coefficient by itself should be taken with the pinch of salt, we are running a
good number of estimations we would expect 1 / 10 to be a false positive if we take results at 10%
level of significance. However, combining the findings of column one and two, and Map 9 lead me
to think that Line 2 lead low and middle performance students to change their travel patterns. A
higher willingness to apply to schools farther from home, and in close proximity to Line 2 stations
highlights the importance of ease of access. The fact that we see no significant impact on high
achievement students leads me to believe that this group was highly motivated and willing to face
more difficulties to access their preferred academic profile. Higher cost of access, in terms of time
and reliability, before the Metrobus Line 2 seem to have precluded some student from applying to
schools along Line 2’s path.
For my analysis it is important to assess how the changes in the set of preferred schools reflect
in the characteristics of the school allocated to the student after the COMIPEMS process. The
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results for this second set of variables can be found in Table 10. As in Table 9 we see little or no
impact for students living in areas benefited by Line 1, in the upper panel. This should be no
surprise since students in this area of the city did not modify none of the observable characteristics
of their application process. The core element is that Line 1 is being developed in a relatively
affluent area with better access to both, private vehicles, and other mass transit infrastructure.
This renders the marginal effect of Line 1 less meaningful for residents. The only variable in which
we observe significant effects (at 10% confidence) is in the difference between the students’ score
(in the placement test) and the average score among students allocated to the same high school
as him or her. For students at the top and bottom of the performance distribution the average
score of their peers in the allocated school decreased by about 0.05 standard deviations after
Metrobus Line 1 opened. It is important to notice that the average entrance score of the students
in the school is composed by all students, including those living outside of the areas benefited by
the four lines of Metrobus. This decrease in average score could indicate that students from more
disadvantaged areas can access more easily the same schools as students living in the area of
Line 1 once the Metrobus is built.
The same logic applied to understand the lack of effect on Line 1 can be used to assess the
impact of Line 2 (in the bottom panel of Table 10). Public transit improvements should be more
meaningful in areas that have less access to private vehicle and who, previous to the new lines,
had less access to the mass transit network. Why is it then, that despite this, apparently sound,
logic we find no significant effect on any of the allocated-school characteristics nor in the
probability for under-matching for students living in areas benefited by Line 2? Table 10 shows
that the impact of transit improvements can be very different for students at different levels of the
score distribution. There is no significant effect of Line 2 on the characteristics of the school
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allocated to students in the benefited areas because students at different levels of the score
distribution show significant and opposite effects for the four variables of interest. This is
particularly the case when we compare the effects for student with high and medium achievement
(rows six and seven of Table 10), since there is little effect for students at the bottom of the score
distribution living in areas benefited by Line 2.
On the one hand students at the top of the score distribution experience: 1) A decrease in the
average score of student allocated to the same school as them; by about 0.06 SD of the city-level
results, 2) Schools with a wider range of scores, expressed as schools with higher standard
deviation in the entrance exam results of allocated students, 3) Schools that have fewer students,
by an estimated of 103 students, and 4) Are 18% more likely to be under-matched in their
allocated school.
On the other hand students in the middle of the score distribution experience: 1) An increase in
the average score of student allocated to the same school as them; by about 0.05 SD of the city-
level results, 2) Schools with a narrower range of scores, expressed as schools with lower
standard deviation in the entrance exam results of allocated students, 3) Schools that have more
students, by an estimated of 91 students, and 4) Are 28% less likely to be under-matched in their
allocated school.
This is important to highlight since it reflects that in this case improving access to mass transit led
to very different effects for different groups of the student population. It is important to highlight
that the allocated school is a result of the preferred set of schools and the performance on the
placement test. In Table 9 and Map 9 we observed that students in Line 2 seem to be applying
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more to schools that a little farther, but more importantly, that are in the path of the Metrobus. My
hypothesis, to be analyzed in the next section, is that the transit improvements lead students in
the top and middle of the score distribution to apply to the same set of schools. While this is an
improvement for students in the middle of the distribution, this could be seen as a “downgrade”
for students at the top of the distribution. The consequences for undermatching are that while
overall undermatching is going down19 it goes down more for students in the middle of the
placement-test score distribution.
5.3 Interpretation of findings
While the findings might be interesting on their own it is important to put them in context and to
analyze the potential mechanisms behind them. Graph 3 presents information before and after
Line 1 started operations. In the left panel I show the cumulative percentage of the students living
in each area (Line 1, Line 2 and Line 3 & 5) who are allocated to the nth school. Schools are
ordered by the percentage of students living in the area benefited by Line 2 allocated to this
school. This ordering was selected given that the main set of results of the previous sections were
found in the analysis of the effects of Line 2.
In the left panel we observe that close to 98% of students living in areas benefited by Line 2 are
allocated to one of these 100 “most preferred” schools (of about 400 high schools in Mexico City).
Between 85% and 90% of students living in areas benefited by Line 1, Line 3 and Line 5 are also
allocated to these 100 schools. While the lines are far from each other the strong intersection in
the preferred school show that these lines are relatively close in perspective to the larger
19 This can be seen in the Undermatching trend graph in Appendix 1.
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metropolitan area. The fact that these 100 schools are allocated to such a large percentage of
the students living in the Metrobus benefited areas does not mean exclusively students from these
areas are allocated to them. Students from areas benefited by a Metrobus line do not exceed
40% of the allocated students in any high school, and in total they don’t exceed 15% of the
allocated students in the 100 most preferred high schools.
In the left hand side of Graph 3 we see that the cumulative percentage remained relatively stable
after Line 1 started operation for the students living in the area under analysis. This can be
observed in the small distance between the pre and post lines in the extreme right of the graph
(the cumulative enrollment at the 100th school). Most of the changes in assignment took place
between the same 100 schools. This is also true for the comparison before and after Line 2 started
operations, presented in the left section of Graph 4.
The right side of Graph 3 shows the changes in the percentage of student from each benefited
area allocated to these schools before and after Line 1 started operations. The ordering of the
school remains the same; so for example; in Graph 3 we see that the school to which the most
students from Line 2 are allocated represents about 10% (10.43% exactly) of all students in the
colonias served by Line 2. This is the first, and lowest, point of the dashed blue line in the left plot.
On the right plot the blue line shows the change before and after Line 1 was introduced in
percentage of students coming from areas benefited by Line 2, and the other lines accordingly.
For this first school the percentage of Line 2 changed by -2.5% from 20.5% to 18%20 of all students
enrolled in the school.
20 These last two numbers cannot be seen neither on the right nor in the left of Graph 3 and 4, but can be provided
upon request.
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The right hand-side of Graph 3 seems to show no relation in the percentage changes of students
allocated from each area in the different schools. This is confirmed by the OLS results in Table
11. In this case the dependent variable is the percentage of students allocated to the school that
comes from colonias benefited by Line 2. The independent variables are the percentage of
students allocated to the school that come from colonias benefited by Line 1 and Line 3 and 5.
The two different columns show the results before (column 1) and after (column 2) Metrobus Line
1 started operations. In both cases assignment of students from Line 1, Line 3 and Line 5 cannot
help us explain the variations in the assignment of Line 2 to these schools neither before nor after
Metrobus Line 1 was completed.
This leads me to interpret that Metrobus Line 1 did not change the ability of students living in the
benefited area of Line 2 to correlate their assignment patters with their more affluent peers living
in areas benefited by Line 1. However, Line 1 did affect the average placement test score of the
schools attended by students living in benefited areas, as per Table 10. My hypothesis is that this
happened due to students switching from schools in in the periphery to schools closer to the
center of the city that were served by Metrobus Line 1. Map 8 shows the schools that concentrate
the highest percentage of students living in the area benefited by Line 1. We observe that most
of these high schools are along Metrobus Line 1, which tells us that people also select schools
closer to them. The more interesting pattern, which supports the previous hypothesis, is that
schools in the areas served by Metrobus L1 increased their weight in the allocation of students
living in the area served by Line 1, particularly those schools in the center of the city. The change
in enrollment in the schools closer to Line 1 is accompanied by a fall in importance from the two
high schools further North-west in the map, which concentrated close to 5% of the students before
the transit improvements, and dropped to below 1% after Line 1 started operations.
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Graph 4 presents the effects of Line 2 in the patterns of assignment of the students benefited by
this line and on the control group. The patterns of enrollment observed in Graph 4 are very similar
to those in Graph 3. The 100 schools with more allocated students from areas served by Line 2
agglomerate close to 95% of all students who were allocated to a high school. The same happens
with students living in areas served by Line 1, Line 3 and Line 5. Despite the similarities there are
some important differences. The gap between the Pre and Post allocation is wider for the students
living in areas benefited by Line 2. This indicates a larger amount of switching of students within
these 100 schools, and particularly within the set of 20 most preferred schools. This leads me to
believe the results presented in Table 10 are mostly be driven by “switching” between allocated
schools in this group and by changes in the characteristics of the schools. Under-matching
decreases for students in the middle of the performance distribution as they switch to schools in
the same quartile of performance as their own. When students in the top of the performance
distribution switch to the same schools as the students with medium-performance they increase
the rate of under-matching in this sub group. Unfortunately, I cannot assess whether they switch
for convenience due to the new transit lines.
The plot at the right of Graph 4 also presents an important difference. The change before and
after Line 2 was introduced in percentage of students coming from areas benefited by Line 1 and
Line 2 move together. This is confirmed by the results in Table 12.  Assignment of students from
Line 1, Line 3 and Line 5 cannot help us explain the variations in the assignment of Line 2 to these
schools before Metrobus Line 2 was completed. However, the same OLS estimated for
percentages allocated after Metrobus Line 2 was completed shows a positive and significant
estimate for the percentage of students coming from areas benefited by Line 1. After Line 2 started
operations assignment patterns for students living in benefited areas from both lines start to vary
together. Line 2 allows students living in the benefited areas to profit not only from Line 2, but of
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the network that also includes Line 1. On the other hand students living in areas that will be
benefited by Line 3 and Line 5 still show variations in enrollment that, once including Line 1, are
not significantly related to enrollment variation of Line 2 students. If changes in enrollment by
students living in areas benefited by Line 1 are not included the estimates for Line 3 students
becomes negative and significant at the 5% level. This could be indication that students benefited
by the two Metrobus lines displace students who are not yet served by transit in schools close to
the transit lines.
Map 9 furthers of support the importance of transit on the process of application to public high
schools. The map shows the schools with the higher concentration of students coming from areas
served by Line 2 before and after the line started operations. The percentage allocated to schools
along the Metrobus lines increased by around 25% after it started operation, mainly at the
expense of schools that individually attracted a small percentage of students from the area, that
are not along the path of Line 2, and that are not shown in the map due to both their size, and for
being out of the focus area.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions
This dissertation analyzes the interaction of a school choice policy and one urban improvement.
The school policy is the city-wide application process to senior high school. The urban
improvement is the construction of four new bus rapid transit lines.  The interaction is considered
of interest to assess whether the cost of physically accessing the school, and the mobility within
a city (ease of moving from one place of the city to another) is a barrier to the success of school
choice policies. This is analyzed in the context of student applications to public high schools in
Mexico City. The objective is to observe whether improved access to transit alter the
characteristics of the schools selected by, and allocated to, the students. This research uses the
introduction of different new bus rapid transit lines as a source of variation in the time cost of travel
for individuals living in different parts of the city.
In the first chapter of analysis (Chapter 4) the thesis estimates that about one of every five
students that apply to public high schools in Mexico City is matched to a school that is below his
own performance, estimated as the quartile in the overage score distribution. I refer to this as
under-matching. Literature looking at this subject in other contexts suggests that this has
important negative implications for the likelihood of graduation and other related long-term
outcomes.  Students are allocated to schools below their potential mainly because they list these
schools as their most preferred options in the application process, before more selective
institutions. This is a strategic mistake in the process of selecting a set of most preferred options.
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Why students do not apply to schools in line with their potential has been an issue of debate, with
lack of information emerging as one of the main reasons behind it. In the context of Mexico City I
find that one of the strongest observable determinants of under-matching is not sorting the three
most preferred schools by their selectivity, at the time the student registers to take the COMIPEMS
test.  My analysis also shows that even after considering for this application “mistake”, and
important socioeconomic characteristics of the student there is still a “spatial” level of variation in
the probability of being under-matched. A detailed analysis shows that areas with high levels of
under-matching are also farther from the city center and have relatively less access to mass
transit, given their proximity to the Metro (subway), the main mode of mass transit in Mexico City.
This led me to investigate the role of transit access in the high school application and assignment
process in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. The analysis brings a new perspective to the
general discussion of under-matching, since little analysis has been made on differential patterns
of under-matching under different urban contexts, once the effect of other observables is
accounted for.
Chapter 5 studies the effect of access to transit in the application and assignment process. The
analysis uses the introduction of four bus rapid transit lines as sources of variation of the access
to transit for students living in different parts of the city. The thesis focuses on the effect of the first
two lines, which have routes going North-South and East-West respectively. A map of income
shows that the first line connected mainly middle and high income neighborhoods between each
other. These neighborhoods had relatively good access to transit even before Line 1 was
introduced, and residents were more likely to own a car, making the new line relatively less
important. Line 2 connects relatively poorer neighborhoods in the East and West of the city with
more affluent neighborhoods in the center and South of the served areas. This leads to interesting
and opposite results.
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Students in relatively affluent areas saw the average level of their peers go down after the first
Metrobus line started operations. These schools also became more diverse, with an increase in
the standard deviation of the entrance scores of the allocated students. No effect was found in
the application behavior of students benefited by Line 1 in terms of distance to school, likelihood
of applying to the closest school available, or in the likelihood of being under-matched. On this
last note it is important to acknowledge that under-matching among students living in areas
benefited by Line 1 was already below the level in areas benefited by other lines and in the general
population.  A detailed analysis of where students were allocated showed that some students
benefited by Line 1 did switch to schools in the areas along the route of the new BRT, but Line 1
did not lead to greater mixing in the enrollment patterns between students living in areas benefited
by Line 1 and those in other areas of the city.
Students at the top of the performance distribution in areas benefited by Line 2 were more likely
to be under-matched after Line 2 started operations. They also experienced slightly lower peer
quality and smaller schools. Students in the center of the score distribution (within half a standard
deviation of the mean) benefited the most of the transit improvements. These students
experienced a significant increase in the quality of their peers and the number of students in their
allocated school. They are also significantly less likely to be under-matched. This is of particular
relevance, since this group shows the highest level of under-matching. An important reason
behind these changes is the modification in their application behavior. Students in the middle and
lower part of the performance distribution applied to schools that were farther from their residence
once the new transit line started operations. Furthermore, they applied mote to schools that were
in the path of the new transit line. Students in the lower part of the distribution were significantly
less likely to apply to their closest school as their most preferred option after Metrobus showing a
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willingness to trade distance for quality.
An important limitation of the study is that I cannot effectively assess if students are using the new
mass transit lines, or if their trip has become shorter in time. The relevance of the transit
improvements is being estimated based on origin-destination route models, and not derived from
an origin-destination survey. For this reason it is not possible to isolate the reduction in the time
required at arrive to school as the sole mechanism of the effects found. Other mechanisms that
could be acting at the same time due to the introduction of the mass transit lines would be, an
increase in the labor market opportunities of the head of household, increase in real estate values,
changes in the cost of rental units and changes in the commercial activity of the area due to
increased flow of pedestrian. I find that the access hypothesis is more consistent with the
observed changes, and that is why the present thesis has followed that line. The thesis intends
to contribute to the work of policy makers, and on the general academic literature regarding school
choice, by inquiring the role of transit availability in the process of selection and assignment of a
given school. The present thesis could be extended through the inclusion of other relevant
outcomes such as graduation rates or the perceived return to education. The thesis could also be
improved by using more precise information that allowed for the determinants of the mechanisms
underlying the main findings. This could be done through a detailed origin - destination survey for
students, and their perception of transit.
The findings in this thesis have strong implications in terms of efficiency, access and equity.
Students with strong academic background should attend schools that, at least, match their skills
despite their socioeconomic background. Students living in areas with little access to transit face
higher prices to travel within the city, therefore limiting the effective set of schools to which they
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can attend. These students also tend to be poorer and come from families with lower
socioeconomic status. These results are evidence of the positive effect of transit accessibility on
school choice and on the performance of students in the middle and lower part of the performance
distribution. Transit decreased the cost of traveling for students who might find it harder to access
other schooling options, or who were less motivated to do so. These results highlight the
relevance to assess the potential effectiveness of school-choice policies in different urban
settings, and the need to accompany education policies with urban transportation initiatives to
allow greater accessibility for a greater number of students, providing a more telling meaning to
the word choice.
Tables, Graphs and Maps
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD
Male 0.501
Age (years) 15.28 (1.684)
Mother’s schooling (yrs) 9.229 (3.433)
Family owns a car 0.331
Income (monthly real MXN, 2000) 4,681 (4,030)
Student receives a merit-based cash transfer 0.0669
Student receives a need-based cash transfer 0.0331
Student is working 0.0912
Public middle school 0.941
Number of high school options listed 9.437 (3.824)
Distance to assigned school (meters) 7,331 (6,614)
Distance to 1st Opt. school (meters) 8,071 (6,767)
Select closest school 0.311
Score in placement test (over 128) 66.63 (18.91)
Observations 2,308,865
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Table 2: Quartile of Performance by School on t and t-1
Qt _ Qt−1 1 2 3 4
1 82.53 10.97 0.00 0.00
2 17.47 84.49 12.91 0.23
3 0.00 4.54 84.64 4.09
4 0.00 0.00 2.45 95.68
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Percentage of schools with an average entrance score by quartile
of performance comparing current (rows) and previous (columns)
year
Table 3: Placement test result (quartile) for school assigned
Student _ School 1 2 3 4 Total
1 237,021 322,003 15,737 0 574,761
2 73,215 390,302 113,730 49 577,296
3 36,105 220,233 229,949 91,812 578,099
4 9,152 56,280 69,672 443,605 578,709
Total 355,493 988,818 429,088 535,466 2,308,865
Students by quartile of their entrance score (rows) and the quartile
of the average entrance score at the school assigned (columns)
Table 4: Max quartile possible for a student
Student _ School 1 2 3 4 Total
1 1,435 337,543 235,783 0 574,761
2 0 47,780 512,991 16,525 577,296
3 0 0 120,609 457,490 578,099
4 0 0 0 578,709 578,709
Total 1,435 385,323 869,383 1,052,724 2,308,865
Students by quartile of their entrance score (rows) and the quartile
of the average entrance score at the school with the maximum
selectivity that they could have attended(columns)
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Table 5: Pct. of students that list preferred schools in order of selectivity.
For students who under-matched
# of options ordered Freq. Percent Cum
None 102,809 22.13% 22.13%
First 2 schools 86,023 18.51% 40.64%
First 3 schools 64,221 13.82% 54.46%
First 4 schools 50,904 10.96% 65.42%
First 5+ schools 160,700 34.58% 100%
Total 464,657 100%
Table 6: Pct. of students that list preferred schools in order of selectivity.
For students who did not under-matched
# of options ordered Freq. Percent Cum
None 224,338 12.16% 12.16%
First 2 schools 257,432 13.96% 26.12%
First 3 schools 233,443 12.66% 38.78%
First 4 schools 215,062 11.66% 50.44%
First 5+ schools 913,933 49.56% 100.00%
Total 1,844,208 100.00%
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Table 7: Logistic Regression (OR) on Under-Matching
Logit on Prob. of (1) (2)
Being Under-matched, Undermatch Undermatch
Odds Ratios 2002 -2013 2004-2013






Mother’s schooling 0.999 1.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Merit-based transfer 0.937*** 0.928***
(0.01) (0.01)
Need-based transfer 0.987 0.977*
(0.01) (0.01)
Student is working 1.137*** 1.121***
(0.01) (0.01)
Number of HS options listed 0.980*** 0.979***
(0.00) (0.00)
3 first selected schools 1.865*** 1.768***
ordered by selectivity (0.02) (0.02)
Distance to a 1.000 1.000
“quality” school (0.00) (0.00)
Select closest option in top 3 1.080*** 1.075***
(0.02) (0.02)
Average score in HS 0.950* 0.913***
test in the colonia (0.03) (0.02)
Family owns 0.949***
a car (0.00)
No. of Obs. 1,646,023 1,393,082
SE in parenthesis, all logistic regression with standard errors clustered at
the colonia level. For students from public middle schools who listed at
least 3 options and that received a final school offer. Year FE included in
all regressions
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics: Areas Benefited by Metrobus
Line 1 Line 2 Line 3 Line 5
Mean (SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD)
Male 0.510 0.509 0.516 0.507
Age 15.55 15.71 15.71 15.45
(2.047) (2.350) (2.382) (1.978)
Mother’s schooling (yrs) 9.972 9.442 9.251 9.369
(3.733) (3.439) (3.375) (3.252)
Family owns a car 0.331 0.313 0.264 0.301
Income 5.607 4.824 4.475 4.495
(monthly real MXN, 2000) (4.991) (4.099) (3.685) (3.780)
Student receives a 0.0567 0.0404 0.0416 0.0430
merit-based transfer
Student receives a 0.00230 0.00161 0.00255 0.00101
need-based transfer
Student is working 0.0989 0.114 0.120 0.101
Public middle school 0.852 0.936 0.942 0.941
Number of HS options listed 7.949 8.687 8.513 8.753
(3.731) (3.813) (3.806) (3.720)
Distance to assigned school (km) 5.704 5.403 5.680 5.368
(4.197) (4.621) (4.225) (3.907)
Distance to 1st Opt. school (km) 4.688 4.955 5.170 4.380
(3.442) (3.992) (3.645) (3.585)
Select closest option in top 3 0.439 0.475 0.305 0.402
Score in placement test (over 128) 70.24 65.91 66.34 65.75
(17.98) (17.44) (17.80) (17.59)
Percentage of Under match 0.176 0.201 0.191 0.183
Observations 49,999 82,172 48,585 44,684
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Table 9: Effect of Transit in Application
Average Effect of Distance to first Prob. of ranking Prob. of applying
Treatment 3 options (km) first 3 options to closest school
Line 1: All students -0.08 -0.10* -0.02
Obs: 64,857 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
High Achievement 0.04 0.13 -0.08
Obs: 27,806 (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
Medium Achievement -0.14 -0.23*** 0.08
Obs: 23,328 (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Low Achievement -0.13 -0.14 -0.04
Obs: 13,723 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Line 2: All students 0.20*** -0.02 -0.02
Obs: 87,750 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
High Achievement 0.10 -0.05 0.11
Obs: 37,518 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Medium Achievement 0.24** 0.06 -0.06
Obs: 30,625 (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Low Achievement 0.20* -0.08 -0.16*
Obs: 19,607 (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)
SE in parenthesis, all regression with standard errors clustered at the colonia
level. For students from public middle schools who listed at least 3 options
and that received a final school offer. Year FE included in all regressions. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 10: Effect of Transit in School Characteristics
Average Effect of Diff. in score between SD of scores Number of Prob. of
Treatment avg in allocated in allocated students in Under-match
school and student school allocated school
Line 1: All students -0.02 0.01* -16.05 -0.03
Obs: 64,857 (0.02) (0.00) (22.45) (0.04)
High achievement -0.05* 0.01 -26.96 0.11
Obs: 27,806 (0.03) (0.00) (34.14) (0.09)
Medium achievement -0.01 0.01 -54.09 -0.07
Obs: 23,328 (0.02) (0.00) (45.52) (0.11)
Low achievement -0.03* 0.00 -17.05 0.12
Obs: 13,723 (0.02) (0.01) (37.11) (0.31)
Line 2: All students -0.01 -0.00 5.11 -0.08
Obs: 87,750 (0.01) (0.00) (14.74) (0.05)
High Achievement -0.06*** 0.01** -102.49*** 0.18**
Obs: 37,518 (0.02) (0.00) (23.42) (0.08)
Medium Achievement 0.05*** -0.01*** 90.51*** -0.28***
Obs: 30,625 (0.02) (0.00) (28.10) (0.08)
Low Achievement -0.00 0.00 104.67*** -0.45
Obs: 19,607 (0.02) (0.00) (30.34) (0.20)
SE in parenthesis, all regression with standard errors clustered at the colonia
level. For students from public middle schools who listed at least 3 options
and that received a final school offer. Year FE included in all regressions. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 11: Pct. of enrollment from Line 2 students by school before and after
Line 1
Pre L2 enrollment Post L2 enrollment
Pre L1 enrollment 0.279
(1.78)
Pre L3 enrollment 0.0974
(1.56)
Post L1 enrollment 0.268
(1.84)





t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: Pct. of enrollment from Line 2 students by school before and after
Line 2
Pre L2 enrollment Post L2 enrollment
Pre L1 enrollment 0.272
(1.75)
Pre L3 enrollment 0.109
(1.74)
Post L1 enrollment 0.371∗∗
(2.97)





t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Graph 1. Standardized distribution of COMIPEMS scores
Graph 2. Standardized distribution of COMIPEMS scores; Students living in
areas benefited by a MB line
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Graph 3. Cumulative Enrollment in Most Preferred Schools and Change in Percentage En-
rollment by Students from Each Area. Pre and Post Line 1
Graph 4. Cumulative Enrollment in Most Preferred Schools and Change in Percentage En-
rollment by Students from Each Area. Pre and Post Line 2
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Graph 5. Trend: Select closest school Graph 6. Trend: under-match
Graph 7. Trend: Diff. between score Graph 8. Trend: Route Distance
and assigned school to assigned school
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